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Abstract 
Objective: 1) To evaluate the relationship between National Health Service 
Corps (NHSC) physicians' participation in Organizational Citizenship Behaviors 
(OCBs) and their intention to stay at their assigned site or serve the underserved 
post obligation. 2) To examine the relationship between NHSC physician and 
site characteristics and NHSC physicians' participation in OCBs. 
Design: Secondary analysis of a cross-sectional observational study. 
Source of Study Data: Thomas R. Konrad, of the Sheps Center at UNC-CH, 
and colleagues at Mathematica Policy Research collected the data as part of "An 
Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the National Health Service Corps, "1 a project 
performed for the Health Services Resource Administration in 1998. The data 
come from a nationally representative survey of NHSC clinicians serving part of 
their NHSC obligation on December 31, 1997. 
Sample: 387 NHSC physicians, stratified by Scholarship/Loan Repayment 
NHSC program and by whether they served their NHSC obligation in an urban or 
a rural community. The sample included 55 urban scholars, 104 urban loan 
repayors, 105 rural scholars, and 123 rural loan repayors. 
Findings: 1) NHSC physician participation in OCBs ("above and beyond" 
behaviors) is significantly associated with physician intention to stay at his/her 
NHSC assigned site for one year post obligation (p<.001) and with physician 
intention to serve the underserved for at least four years post obligation (p= 
.014), but not significantly associated with intention to stay at his/her NHSC 
assigned site for four years post obligation (p=.191 ). 2) Physicians with higher 
educational debt are involved in significantly more OCBs (p= .023). Scholars 
serving in rural areas participate in significantly more OCBs than do scholars or 
loan repayors serving in urban areas. Service in federally funded clinics and 
service at clinics with more full time providers are associated with performing 
fewer OCBs, but higher salaries, longer service, and family satisfaction with the 
community are associated with performing more OCBs 
Conclusions: Participating in OCBs is correlated with intention to stay at the 
NHSC site and with a commitment to continue serving the underserved. 
Physician and site characteristics that promote OCB participation suggest 
domains for intervening to encourage more physician engagement. 
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1. Introduction 
The National Health Service Corps (NHSC) is a federal program created 
in 1970 to encourage health care providers to work in underserved areas of the 
United States. The NHSC has placed more than 23,000 health care providers in 
underserved areas since its inception,2 but as of 2002, around 50 million 
Americans were still living in areas with an insufficient supply of primary care 
providers (PCPs). 3 The U.S. still needs a NHSC to help redistribute health care 
professionals, and the NHSC needs to recruit and retain health care providers 
more efficiently. The intent of this master's paper is to explore factors that might 
enable the NHSC to do so. 
Recruiting physicians to provide primary care in underserved areas is 
challenging. First, primary care medicine is less popular with graduating medical 
students than are medical specialties. Specialists earn up to three times and 
more the salary of primary care physicians, and specialists generally receive 
more prestige as well. 4 Primary care role models are not prevalent in medical 
school, and the current system of medical school rotations preferentially exposes 
medical students to specialists 5 Finally, many medical students are attracted to 
the specialist's ability to focus in depth on one clinical area, rather than needing 
to keep up with all of general medicine and its rapid changes.' 
Second, it is difficult to recruit physicians to serve the underserved 
because serving the underserved is hard work, often pays less, and some 
physicians worry about having a lower quality of life in NHSC-targeted areas. 6 
Mauksch believes that Americans' "persistent beliefs that those who are needy 
and those who are socially disadvantaged are somehow morally and socially less 
worthy" (p 42)5 also influences the number of medical students who are willing to 
join the NHSC and serve the underserved. 
Eric Redman, a senator's aide, and Dr. Abraham Bergman, a pediatrician 
from Seattle, created the NHSC in 1970 when they wrote the Emergency Health 
Personnel Act of 1970 (P .L. 91-623). The Act expanded the authority of the 
Public Health Service (PHS) to allow PHS commissioned officers to provide 
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direct patient care to patients in federally designated "Health Manpower Shortage 
Areas"(p 1)'. 
Originally, the only incentive to join the NHSC was the ability of NHSC 
physicians to avoid the military draft of doctors.6 A "doctor draft" separate from 
the general draft began in 1950 and required physicians to serve for two years in 
either the military or the PHS 8 As an extension of the PHS, physicians serving in 
the NHSC would be spared a mandatory military tour.6 The military draft of 
physicians ended in 19739 just two years after the enactment of the NHSC and 
one year after the first 20 NHSC volunteers served, obviating this means of 
enticing physicians to join the NHSC. 
Currently, the NHSC uses scholarship and loan repayment programs to 
encourage health care providers to serve in underserved areas. The scholarship 
program, enacted in 1972,10 provides one year of financial support for health 
professional students in exchange for a one year obligation to serve in an 
underserved area, with a minimum two year service obligation. 11 The loan 
repayment program, enacted in 1987, allows the NHSC to repay a portion of a 
provider's medical education loans in exchange for providing health care in an 
underserved area.12 
Initially the scholarship program was challenged by a large portion of 
scholarship recipients who chose to default on their scholarship rather than fulfill 
their service obligation. Between the scholarship program's inception in 1972 
and 1980, 30% of scholarship recipients chose to default on their scholarship.13 
Until 1980, scholars who defaulted were only required to pay the government the 
amount of their scholarship plus interest over a three year period. By 1980, 
Congress had passed an amendment that required defaulting NHSC scholarship 
recipients to pay back three times the amount of their scholarship in a single 
year.13. 14 
Dr. Fitzhugh Mullan, the head of the NHSC from 1975 to1984, 15 attributed 
a portion of the high default rate to the time elapsing between receipt of an 
NHSC scholarship, at the beginning of medical school, and fulfillment of the 
obligation to serve, coming four years later, and following a curriculum that can 
be specialty-centric and discouraging for students wanting to go into primary 
care. The NHSC attempted to ameliorate this problem with programs including 
an NHSC preceptorship and NHSC orientation conferences to help encourage 
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student interest in providing primary care to the underserved.13 Also, the NHSC 
instituted a personal interview with all scholarship recipients to ensure that 
students understand the seriousness of the service obligation and the likelihood 
that service will take place in a rural area (because 70% of NHSC approved sites 
are rura1). 16 Perhaps some of these methods of encouraging service to the 
underserved are having an effect: in 1997, an impressive 97% of NHSC 
recipients fulfilled their obligation to serve in an underserved area. 17 
Gauging the overall success of the NHSC is difficult, because the initial 
legislation did not include explicit targets and timelines for the program. One way 
of considering success of the NHSC is the number of patients who were able to 
see a provider who otherwise would have gone without care. By this definition, 
the implication is that the NHSC has been very successful. According to its 
website, between 1972 and 2003 more than 23,000 NHSC providers have 
served; it is doubtful that so many physicians would have gone to these 
underserved areas without the NHSC.18 Turnover of providers, however, is high 
and continuous, potentially impairing physician-patient relationships. 
Nguyen, O'Sullivan and Fournier measured NHSC success in 1991 by 
comparing the difference in perinatal mortality rates in Dade County, Florida, at 
community health centers (CHCs) that did and did not have NHSC physicians. 
The authors observed a significant three-year reduction in perinatal mortality in 
the clinics that had NHSC providers, but not in others. The authors estimated 
that at least 320 fewer perinatal deaths occurred in Dade County than expected 
compared to a historical control, and attributed the drop in mortality to the 
presence of NHSC providers.19 
The NHSC is currently under the control of the Health Resources and 
Services Administration (HRSA) (see figure 1 ). Its goals and funding are 
influenced by HRSA's mission and objectives. HRSA is "the principal Federal 
Agency charged with increasing access to health care for those who are 
medically underserved" (p 9f0 and its objectives include "lmprov[ing] the 
distribution of health professionals in underserved areas, including rural and 
border areas" and "promot[ing] the development of a culturally diverse and 
representative health care workforce" (p 7-8).20 
3 
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Figure 1: NHSC in the organizational chart: 
goals and funding ofNHSC are influenced by mission of 
all departments above 
Overall, the success of a program is grounded in its ability to meet its 
stated goals. The NHSC has multiple goals, including improving the health of 
underserved communities.' Assessing its success requires an understanding of 
the historical and political context surrounding its creation, and I provide that in 
the first part of the theoretical perspectives section 
Attracting physicians to underserved areas is not enough, however. 
Retaining physicians beyond their service obligation or, at least, retaining their 
commitment to serve the underserved, is of critical importance. Thus I will turn 
next to a review of the literature on the relationship between physician 
satisfaction and physician retention. Finally, I will explore the concept of 
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors (OCBs), an idea from the organizational 
psychology literature used to describe employees' "above and beyond" 
behaviors. I hypothesize that OCBs are an observable intervening step between 
physician and clinical site characteristics, including physician satisfaction, and 
physician retention. 
Following the theoretical perspectives, I present my own secondary 
analysis of a nationally representative survey of NHSC physicians in 1997/1998. 
For simplicity, I focus only on the role of primary care physicians in the NHSC in 
this paper although the NHSC recruits health care providers from other 
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disciplines including nurse practitioners, physicians assistants, certified nurse 
midwives, dentists, mental health care providers, and dental hygenists2 I use 
the survey data first to analyze the effect of multiple provider, clinic and program 
factors on providers' engagement in OCBs, and then to analyze the relationship 
between providers' engagement in OCBs and providers' intention to leave their 
assigned clinical site. I obtain partial corroboration of providers' self-reported 
levels of OCBs from a parallel survey of NHSC site administrators. 
I make recommendations based on this analysis for the future research of 
OCBs in the NHSC context and I discuss potential policy implications of my study 
for multiple potential stakeholder groups. Multiple political actors have a stake in 
the policies and the overall success of the NHSC. Legislators control both the 
statutory mandates of the NHSC and its funding and they are interested in policy 
changes that would affect future funding requirements and the efficiency of the 
NHSC. Federal NHSC administrators are held accountable for the effectiveness 
of the NHSC, and are thus interested in any potential policy changes, as well as 
strategies to increase the NHSC's support. NHSC site administrators are the 
managers of individual clinical sites where NSHC-obligated clinicians serve. As 
clinical managers, site administrators are keenly aware of the difficulty of 
recruiting and retaining high quality providers in underserved areas and they 
have an interest in learning how to keep NHSC providers as long as possible. In 
many ways, the local clinical administrators have among the highest stakes-
even higher than those of the NHSC physicians, and almost as high as those of 
the patients -- and the least political influence. Perhaps only NHSC clinicians 
and their patients in these underserved communities have weaker political 
voices, the former because their terms with the NHSC are limited, and the latter 
because they lack virtually all of the resources required for effective action in the 
political arena. 
This paper is a two part political analysis. I will examine the potential 
influence of physician and site factors on physician involvement in "above and 
beyond" behaviors, and I will analyze the effectiveness and plausibility of those 
behaviors as predictors of physician retention. 
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II. Theoretical Perspectives 
A. Beyond Legislation: Additional goals and methods of 
the National Health Service Corps 
The goal of the NHSC is to 
"improve the delivery of health services to persons living in communities 
and areas of the United States where health personnel and services are 
inadequate to meet the health needs of the residents of such 
communities and areas"7 
This dryly worded explanation of provider redistribution does not adequately 
express the other goals of the NHSC that evolved after the process of legislation 
was complete. Redman and Bergman crafted The Emergency Health Personnel 
Act of 1970 as a politically feasible and deliberately vague outline of a federal 
program to rectify physician maldistribution. Redman's and Bergman's idea of 
the NHSC was that it would be a corps of altruistic young physicians serving in 
"doctor deficient" areas voluntarily in exchange for a salary from the federal 
government and exemption from the military draft of physicians. Redman and 
Bergman saw the initial form of the NHSC as a "small but imaginative 
experiment" (p 38)6 , which implies that aspects of the program can and should be 
adjusted and tinkered with as needed. The ambiguity of the original NHSC 
legislation left the structure and goals of the NHSC open to multiple 
interpretations. The NHSC has developed longstanding goals beyond those 
specified in the original statute in the years since P.L. 91-623 passed. 
From private-practice to public service 
Bergman and Redman packaged their idea of a corps of public-spirited 
doctors in a politically feasible container that emphasized private-practice 
medicine. According to Oberlander, political feasibility "represents what is doable 
in the real world" (p W3-392) 21 Throughout the political process, Bergman and 
Redman deliberately stressed the bill's potential to strengthen the current private-
practice system of health care and down played any "socialized medicine" 
aspects. Medicine as private practice was a politically powerful concept in 
Washington D.C. in 1970. Its creators claimed that the NHSC would promote 
private practice by "sensitizing" physicians to the needs of the underserved and 
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encouraging NHSC physicians to open private practices in their assigned 
communities after completing their service obligation.6 
In addition, P.L. 91-623 dispelled worries about the federal government 
becoming financially responsible for underserved communities in the long term. 
The Act clearly states that physicians should charge for their services and 
"recover 'the reasonable cost' of providing medical care" (p 430),22 implying that 
the communities would sustain their own providers. 
P.L. 91-623's vagueness left room for interpretation in the implementation 
of the NHSC, and the administrators of the Health Services Administration 
applied their own perspectives and goals to their interpretation of the NHSC 
legislation. P.L. 91-623 delegated the responsibility of implementing the NHSC 
to the Health Services and Mental Health Administration but, during a 
reorganization in the early 1970's, the NHSC quickly became a part of the Health 
Services Administration (HSA)22 which has been part of HRSA since 1982.22• 23 
One of the goals of the HSA was to "develop health care service delivery for 
medically indigent inner-city, rural, and migrant populations"(p 431 ). 22 The HSA 
also controlled public service programs such as Community Health Centers 
(CHCs) and Migrant Health Centers (MHCs). The philosophy of the HSA 
supported providing medical care to the poor and disadvantaged in the setting of 
a group practice22 
The HSA was able to shift the focus of the NHSC away from promoting 
private-practice in underserved areas. Although providing medical care to the 
disadvantaged (or 'socialized medicine') was politically risky when Bergman and 
Redman wrote P.L. 91-623, it became a possibility in the mid 1970's. First, in 
1972, a revision of P.L. 91-623 stated that the NHSC should not consider a 
community's ability to pay for its own care when placing NHSC physicians. 22 
Ignoring a community's ability to pay for services made staying in a community to 
work in private practice without federal support nearly impossible. The promotion 
of private practice was shown to be an obvious failure in 197 4, when only 6% of 
NHSC clinicians said they would stay in the community as private providers after 
fulfilling their obligation. Everyone except for the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW), which in 1974 continued to encourage 
physicians to pursue private-practice in underserved areas,22 must have known 
by then that the NHSC would not succeed as a private-practice model. 
7 
L 
l--
t 
~-
r 
' 
r 
With such clear signs of the infeasibility of private practice in underserved 
areas, it is not surprising that the HSA was having difficulty competing with 
private practices to recruit and retain clinicians at CHCs. The HSA helped the 
CHC program in the late 1970's by encouraging NHSC clinicians to serve in 
federally funded clinics, an expansion of the NHSC role. By 1980, more than 
two-thirds of NHSC clinicians were serving in federally funded group practices 
such as CHCs.22 With freedom from tight congressional control, NHSC officials 
adjusted the goals of the NHSC to overlap the goals of the other HSA programs. 
In 1990, NHSC director Donald Weaver maintained that the NHSC, CHCs, and 
Area Health Education Centers were all part of an effort to "remove the 
geographic, cultural and financial barriers to primary care for underserved 
people"(p 244 ).'6 
Role expansion, or "mission creep," in the NHSC apparently did not 
attract Congressional attention at the time. Lawmakers may truly not have 
noticed the imprecision of the NHSC legislation, or they may have been content 
to appear to be against socialized medicine while allowing the NHSC to change 
itself into a health care program for the indigent and the disadvantaged. 
Increasing presence of minorities in health care 
The scholarship program allowed the NHSC to help to increase the 
presence of underrepresented minorities in the health workforce and increase the 
number of PCPs in medicines The racial distribution of the U.S. health work 
force does not reflect the racial distribution of the U.S. population. For example, 
in 1985, 12% of the U.S. population but only 3% of U.S. physicians were African 
American 4 The NHSC can use scholarships to recruit medical students, 
including ethnic minorities and people with disadvantaged backgrounds, who 
would otherwise be unable to afford to attend medical school.5 The NHSC 
scholarship program is successful at targeting minority students; in 2005 51% of 
NHSC scholars were racial or ethnic minorities.24 
Many researchers and policy-makers believe that such needy populations 
are more likely to continue to serve the underserved.25 A study of physicians' 
reasons for serving the underserved found that many minority physicians and 
physicians with rural backgrounds reported feeling comfortable serving in this 
way because of familiarity- these are the communities they know6 
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The Loan Repayment Program serves the NHSC's original goal, but not 
its other objectives. The Loan Repayment Program allows NHSC administrators 
to get NHSC clinicians into the field more quickly 27 and appears to be associated 
with higher job satisfaction than is true for NHSC scholarship recipients.'· 28 
However, the Loan Repayment Program cannot be used to further the goals of 
"increasing the number of underrepresented minorities in medicine or the total 
numbers of PCPs available" (p 244) 16 because recipients of the Joan repayment 
have already completed medical school and decided on their course of study 
when they apply for NHSC support. Although the Loan Repayment Program 
may be more efficient in attaining the original goal of getting clinicians into the 
field than is the Scholarship program, the NHSC administration values the 
scholarship program for its contribution toward reaching subsequent objectives.16 
Control by the lawmakers 
Lawmakers never had significant control over the NHSC because the 
Emergency Health Personnel Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-623) did not meet the 
"hierarchy assumption." Frank Thompson describes the hierarchy assumption as 
the idea that "elected policymakers ought to exert considerable control over the 
implementation of programs" (p. 427). 22 Lawmakers' control stems from their 
ability to ensure program compliance with a specified administrative organization, 
and guarantee that the program is meeting the goals and objectives as they are 
defined in the original legislation. P.L. 91-623 does not fit the hierarchy 
assumption because the original legislation did not define goals for the NHSC 
and did not specify a timetable for implementation of the program or provide a 
target number of enrolled providers. Even the concept of "critical health 
manpower shortage areas," the term used to describe the areas where NHSC 
providers were allowed to practice, was not defined in P.L. 91-623.22 The 
vagueness of the text freed the NHSC from close Congressional control. 
The main form of legislative control over the NHSC is the ability to alter 
the funding level of the program. The NHSC has been less a focus for budget 
cuts than are larger programs such as Medicare and Medicaid,22 but budget cuts 
have influenced the direction of the NHSC. For example, the budget cuts of the 
1980's limited the ability of the NHSC to fulfill even its most basic missions. The 
Scholarship Program reached a peak in 1985 when over 1,600 NHSC 
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scholarship recipients were available to serve in underserved communities.16 In 
1980, the Graduate Medical Education National Advisory Committee predicted a 
significant physician surplus in future years. The predictions led legislators to 
believe that in an era of physician surplus the NHSC would be unnecessary, 
because market forces would cause physicians to diffuse to underserved areas 
on their own_4 As a result, the NHSC budget was significantly cut in the 1980s 
and Congress started to phase out the NHSC by limiting funding.27 The budget 
cuts meant that only 123 NHSC scholarship recipients were available to serve in 
1990. Luckily, by the middle of the 1980s Congress realized that the "diffusion" 
method was not going to solve the country's provider maldistribution problem and 
"[t]he NHSC was able to reinstitute a limited Scholarship Program in fiscal year 
1989," (p 244).16 The reinstated Scholarship Program continues to seek equal 
representation of minorities in the health care workforce by "focus[ing] on 
disadvantaged and minority students" (p 244 ).16 
Summary: the winding path from the NHSC's origins 
According to Eric Redman, the NHSC was "never intended to 'solve' the 
doctor distribution problem, and it never will. It is simply one tool for making 
things better. .. its value depends on the skill and understanding of those who use 
it" (p 298t The NHSC administrators may be trying to use the NHSC to solve 
too many problems at once, but the NHSC is not likely to return to the single goal 
of geographically redistributing health care providers because subsequent 
extra legislative goals, such as staffing CHCs and working to increase the number 
of minorities and primary care physicians in medicine, are now publicly 
embraced. This is shown in the Fiscal Year 2007 HRSA budget justification: it 
includes "recruitment of health professionals, including underrepresented 
minority and disadvantaged individuals" (p 1 f 4 as a goal of the NHSC and states 
that around half of all NHSC clinicians are currently working in CHCs/MHCs. 
Budget justifications generally do not break new political ground; the language 
quoted here is evidence that the NHSC's multiple complex goals are now openly 
accepted. 
As of 2000, 26,657 clinicians were needed to eliminate all underserved 
areas, yet only 2,366 NHSC clinicians were serving in such places.3 As we will 
see in the next section, increasing clinician retention beyond clinicians' service 
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obligations is one possible way to decrease the cost of providing clinicians in 
underserved areas. We need to keep the history and the ethos of the NHSC in 
mind as we consider possible practical interventions to increase the effectiveness 
of the NHSC at meeting its goals. For example, the NHSC is unlikely to abandon 
the Scholarship program because the NHSC believes in increasing minorities in 
medicine. Also, the NHSC is unlikely to severe all ties to Consolidated Health 
Center programs (including CHCs/MHCs) because their histories are thoroughly 
intertwined. 
B) The Importance of Satisfaction for Retention 
In early 1970 Dr. Bergman proposed his idea for the NHSC to Eric 
Redman. During their first meeting Bergman explained his belief that 
" ... at least some of the NHSC doctors would become 'sensitized' to the health 
needs of the poor ... after their tours of duty in the corps were complete, these 
doctors would choose the psychic satisfaction of treating the needy over the 
financial rewards of practicing in more affluent communities" (p 31).6 
What Dr. Bergman described was his hope for retention of NHSC physicians 
after the completion of their service obligation. NHSC physician retention, or the 
lack of physician turnover, was important to the creator of the NHSC and 
retention of NHSC physicians continues to be a goal of the NHSC thirty-six years 
later. In this section I will discuss the importance of physician retention. I will 
also discuss the link between satisfaction and retention, and unique factors of the 
NHSC experience that influence satisfaction. 
Importance of retention 
Physician turnover is common and expensive. Studies report annual 
physician turnover rates between 4% and 25% and a cost of recruiting a new 
physician between $20,000 and $123,000.29 The expense of lost revenues from 
the decrease in productivity after physician turnover is thought to be even 
higher.2e. 3o 
Physician turnover is costly for patients and other physicians in the 
practice. Turnover leads to decreased physician morale and decreased patient 
satisfaction.29 Established physicians have to compensate for new physicians' 
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inefficiency and patients have decreased access to physicians because of the 
stress new physicians place on the system.31 
Physician turnover can affect communities. Perpetual physician turnover 
can be "disruptive to communities, where people are less willing to seek medical 
care from organizations staffed by providers who they believe are not committed 
to their communities and who will be gone soon" (p 1556).32 Retention of 
clinicians is important to communities with physician shortages. Poor physician 
recruitment, not poor retention, seems to cause health professional shortages 
because a study in 2004 found that retention of PCPs in rural Health Professional 
Shortage Areas (HPSAs) and rural non-HPSAs was comparable. Good retention 
can make up for inadequate recruitment and retention may be more easily 
improved through "programmatic interventions" (p 1727)33 than is recruitment 
because: 
"retention is related to modifiable characteristics of work ... [but] 
recruitment is related to the relatively immutable characteristics of 
physicians' backgrounds and professional and lifestyle preferences, as 
well as the socioeconomic features of communities" (p 1727).33 
Improving retention of physicians in HPSAs is an important and worthwhile goal. 
NHSC goals and the role of retention efforts 
The NHSC is a "Federal program designed to reduce or eliminate health 
professional shortages in local communities".34 Although poor physician 
retention is not the cause of health professional shortages, retention of 
physicians can help reduce the problem of HPSAs. For example, the NHSC 
placed 837 clinicians in needy communities in 1999 but around 800 clinicians 
leave every year, so the NHSC is close to running in place, rather than 
increasing access. 17 If previously-placed NHSC clinicians remained in their 
needy communities after completing their service obligation, the NHSC could 
send new clinicians to different communities and expand access. 
The NHSC realizes the importance of retention. One of the NHSC's 
strategies to increase overall access to care is "Shaping the way clinicians 
practice by building a community of dedicated health professionals who continue 
to work with the underserved even after their NHSC commitment has been 
fulfilled" (NHSC web site).35 
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Two ways of measuring retention of NHSC providers 
1. Same-Site Retention: The specific definition of retention is important 
to a useful measurement of it. Traditionally, NHSC physician retention was 
measured as the length of time that the NHSC physician remained at his or her 
NHSC-assigned practice site. I will call this same-site retention-'2· 34· 36"38 Same-
site retention is an important measure; it is comparable to the measurement of 
retention used for non-NHSC clinicians, and it captures the costs of turnover for 
clinics, patients, providers and communities. Studies consistently show that 
NHSC physicians have lower same-site retention than do non-NHSC physicians 
despite the changing legislative and financial context of the NHSC. 32· 36· 38 
In the 1980's, levels of same-site retention of NHSC physicians were 
significantly lower than that of non-NHSC physicians, and NHSC participation 
predicted shorter retention. A study found that NHSC physicians were more than 
twice as likely to leave their index practice at any point in time than were non-
NHSC physicians. 32 Even after controlling for individual, community and practice 
factors, "NHSC status remained the strongest predictor of shorter retention" (p 
1556).32 In the late 1980's NHSC and non-NHSC physicians had comparable 
rates of same site retention during their first two years at a clinical site, but far 
fewer NHSC clinicians than non-NHSC clinicians stayed for more than two years. 
The stark change in NHSC physician retention after two years coincides with 
NHSC physicians' two year minimum service obligation.36 
The pattern of lower same site retention for NHSC clinicians persisted 
after the NHSC revitalization legislation of 1990. A study of physicians working 
at CHC/MHCs between 1990 and 1992 found that only 17% of physicians who 
began working at the CHC/MHC under an NHSC obligation remained at the clinic 
after five years, as opposed to 36% of non-NHSC obligated physicians working 
at a CHC/MHC.38 
2. Continuing service to the underserved: Alternatively, retention can 
be measured as the length of time NHSC clinicians continue to work in any 
underserved area or serve any underserved population. "Continuing service to 
the underserved" (CSU) is a more accurate measure of the overall effect of the 
NHSC on underserved populations, but is less relevant for individual patients and 
for clinic administrators who have to recruit replacements-'7 
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Unlike same-site retention, NHSC clinicians are likely to have longer CSU 
than non-NHSC clinicians. A study of practice patterns of physicians in South 
Carolina found that the odds that an NHSC alumna/us was a "high-Medicaid-
participation provider" in 1998 were close to twice the odds that a non-NHSC 
alumna/us was a high-Medicaid-participation provider in 1998. High-Medicaid-
participation was defined as having more than 21.95% of inpatient discharges 
paid for by Medicaid in a year.39 The difference in the odds of CSU was not due 
to differences in the clinicians' demographics, their medical training, or their 
medical specialties. 
The definition of retention (same-site vs. underserved) makes a 
significant difference. In 2004 Holmes modeled PCPs' potential to enroll in the 
NHSC and their subsequent practice locations. He modeled the effect of NHSC 
participation on both same-site retention and CSU. According to the model, 
physicians who join the NHSC have characteristics that suggest that they would 
be more likely to stay at their first clinical site and are more likely to practice in an 
underserved area than physicians who don't join the NHSC. Holmes found that 
NHSC physicians were significantly Jess likely to stay at their original site and 
were more likely to serve in any underserved area than were non-NHSC 
physicians. He suggests that the NHSC experience may decrease the retention 
of providers at their original site (same-site retention) and increase the retention 
of clinicians in any underserved community in the long run (CSU).37 
Political significance of retention statistics 
Choosing to report either same-site or CSU as NHSC clinician retention 
may affect the audience's impression of the success of the NHSC because 
NHSC clinicians' rate of CSU is consistently higher than is their rate of same-site 
retention. I could support an argument of the ineffectiveness of the NHSC at 
decreasing the problem of health professional shortages by choosing to report 
same-site retention. For example, only 38% of NHSC providers placed between 
1986 and 1991 remained at their NHSC-assigned site one year after completing 
their service obligation.34 However, I could support an argument that the NHSC 
is successfully increasing the number of providers serving underserved 
populations nationwide by choosing to report CSU from a1998 survey that found 
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that 52% of NHSC-alumni physicians placed at NHSC sites between 1980 and 
1997 were working with underserved populations in 1998.28 
The timing of studies of retention is also politically important because 
legislative changes and budget changes can affect the success of the NHSC. 
For example, the 1998 survey discussed in the previous paragraph is politically 
significant because 32% of the providers in the study were assigned to their 
NHSC site after the NHSC Revitalization Amendments of 1990, which 
significantly increased the federal financial support for the NHSC. This study 
more closely represents the current NHSC than studies that only include 
providers who were placed in the 1980's, "a time when the NHSC was scheduled 
to be phased out of existence"(p 1 087).40 
Satisfaction and retention 
Workforce researchers seek causes of retention/turnover decisions 
because retention is important to clinic morale and finances. Thus, many studies 
have examined the relationship between satisfaction and retention. Physicians 
who are satisfied with their jobs are more likely to stay.29· 4143 For example, 
physician satisfaction with opportunities to achieve professional goals and with 
their relationship with the community are related to physician retention.'3 
Overall, NHSC physician job satisfaction is also related to retention. The 
odds that NHSC physicians who are satisfied with their work will remain at their 
index site a year after completing their obligation are more than three times 
greater than the odds that NHSC physicians who are not satisfied with their work 
will stay at their index site a year after completing their obligation.34 Overall, 
physicians in the NHSC are less satisfied with their jobs than physicians not in 
the NHSC-'6 Evaluations of NHSC satisfaction and retention must consider 
aspects of satisfaction unique to the NHSC experience. 
1. Matching Process. One thing separating NHSC and non-NHSC 
experience is that NHSC clinicians must find a job from a limited number of 
practice sites and the matching process used for this elicits criticism. A 1994 
report found that 61% of providers who had gone through the matching process 
were dissatisfied with the process and many providers were dissatisfied because 
the NHSC did not provide enough information about the available sites. The 
PHS responded to the report by claiming that they were "planning to provide 
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descriptive profiles of sites" (p B-7).34 The NHSC now has an online job search 
program that makes looking for available sites much easier, but as of February 
251h 2006, only approximately 249 out of the 1839 listed job vacancies for 
physicians had site profiles available.44 Lack of site information may still frustrate 
potential NHSC physicians. 
In addition, 74% of NHSC providers placed between 1987 and 1990 felt 
they had either "very few" or "few" acceptable practice sites available to them.35 
The NHSC cannot increase the number of sites or make the matching process 
more flexible by including less needy sites because of "statutory limitations" (p B-
4).34 The primary mission of the NHSC includes "serving those most in need", 
which necessitates limiting NHSC scholarship clinicians' choice of sites to the 
neediest sites. To give each vacant site a good chance of receiving an NHSC 
clinician, the statute stipulates that the number of vacant sites available for 
NHSC scholars may not be more than two times the number of available NHSC 
scholars.'5 The limitation on the number of available sites makes it difficult for 
NHSC clinicians to find what they consider to be appropriate matches. For 
example, only 38% of NHSC but 73% of non-NHSC physicians grew up in or 
trained in the state of their index site. 34 NHSC physicians whose index site was 
in the state where they grew up or trained and who valued living in a small town 
were much more likely than were others to be at their assigned rural practice a 
year after completing their NHSC obligation. 34 
2. Interaction and communication with NHSC and PHS 
administration. Frustrations with the bureaucracy of the NHSC also affect the 
satisfaction of NHSC providers. For example, "poor communication [between the 
NHSC and providers] can lead providers to default, request transfers, leave after 
their obligation, and/or discourage others from joining the Corps" (p 6).34 In 
addition, many providers and clinic directors do not know who in the NHSC 
administration to contact with problems; in 1994, 27% of providers did not recall 
having any contact with the PHS. Also, 56% of NHSC Scholars placed in 1991 
and 42% of NHSC loan repayment providers placed in 1991 felt that the PHS 
didn't contact them often enough.34 Any analysis of NHSC satisfaction and 
retention must take unique aspects of the NHSC experience such as site 
matching and additional bureaucracy into account. 
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Theory of incentives and rewards 
Overall job satisfaction is not the only measure of employee benefits. 
According to Clark and Wilson in 1961, employees receive three types of 
incentives from organizations in exchange for employee's contributing work.46 
"Material" incentives "have a monetary value or can easily be translated into ones 
that have [monetary value]"(p 134).46 "Solidary" incentives are benefits that are 
intangible and result from the benefit of belonging to an organization, including 
the rewards of "socializing, congeniality, [and] the sense of group membership 
and identification".46 "Purposive" incentives are also intangible and are the 
benefits an employee derives from sharing the purpose of the organization46 
This typology is easily applied to the NHSC. Satisfaction with compensation and 
benefits are evidence of perceived material benefits (or incentives), and family 
satisfaction with the community and clinician satisfaction with the job are 
evidence of solidary benefits. Finally, the psychic satisfaction of serving the 
underserved, as discussed by Dr. Bergman, is evidence of purposive benefit. 
considered physicians stated motivation to serve the underserved as evidence of 
their perceived "purposive" benefit of working for the NHSC. 
Summary: the complex relationship of satisfaction to retention 
Retention is important for all clinical practices, and it is especially so for 
the NHSC. The link between satisfaction and retention has been established in 
the non-NHSC literature and confirmed in the NHSC literature, but the 
relationship is neither strong nor simple. We cannot assume that every 
improvement in satisfaction will translate into an improvement in retention 43 
The NHSC has made some attempts to improve provider retention. For 
example, beginning in 1991, the NHSC began to administer the Professional 
Training Information Questionnaire (PTIQ) to NHSC Scholars to assess which of 
the neediest sites are more attractive to Scholars. The NHSC uses the PTIQ 
results to make the list of sites available for Scholars. By including sites that 
Scholars prefer, the NHSC hopes more providers will stay at their assigned sites, 
creating a permanent solution to the community's provider need.34 
Finally, even if we could easily understand the relationship between 
physician satisfaction and retention, managers would need to measure physician 
17 
l 
f 
I 
' 
i 
t 
' 
satisfaction using in-depth surveys in order to target potential interventions to 
physicians most likely to leave. 
C. Organizational Citizenship Behaviors (OCBs): A potential link 
between NHSC clinician satisfaction and retention 
NHSC clinicians must provide full-time patient care in an underserved 
community to fulfill their NHSC obligation, but some NHSC clinicians choose to 
be more involved in their clinical site and/or their community. Some clinicians 
start a new clinical program, some participate in quality improvement efforts, and 
some take on an additional role as a leader in their clinic or in their community. 
Organizational psychology researchers describe employees' voluntary, positive, 
extra-role behaviors as OCBs. In the organizational psychology literature the 
construct of OCBs is well described, and researchers have examined potential 
influences of employee engagement in OCBs and potential outcomes from 
OCBs. In this section I will discuss the definitions and dimensions of the OCB 
construct and how understanding OCBs in the context of NHSC clinicians' 
activities will benefit researchers, site managers, administrators, clinicians, and 
policy makers. 
The Basics of the OCB construct 
1. Definition of OCB. OCB, as conceived by Dennis Organ in 1977, is a 
measure of employees' behaviors that are not contractually required or rewarded 
but contribute to the overall functioning and effectiveness of the organization.47-55 
OCBs include behaviors such as helping coworkers with work-related tasks and 
following organizational policies when no one is looking.49 Organ clarified the 
OCB construct by explaining that OCBs are not enforceable and are, "rather a 
matter of personal choice ... its omission is not generally understood as 
punishable" (p 86).47 The OCB construct was difficult to operationalize because 
a discretionary and unrewarded behavior in one job setting may be required and 
rewarded in another job setting. Comparing results from studies of OCBs in 
different industries or cultures was difficult because of the requirement that 
behaviors be "discretionary" and not rewarded. 
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In 1997, Organ acknowledged that the current workplace environment 
does not rely on strict job definitions and requirements. He presented a revised 
definition of OCBs that relaxed the requirement that OCBs not be contractually 
required or rewarded. Currently, OCBs are defined as "contributions to the 
maintenance and enhancement of the social and psychological context that 
supports task performance ... [that are]less likely than task performance to be 
regarded by the performer as leading confidently to systemic rewards" (p 91 ).47 
Put simply, OCBs are any behavior that could be considered "going the extra 
mile" for the organization. 
2. Dimensions of OCB. Researchers have divided OCBs into many 
different dimensions. LePine, Erez and Johnson lumped the most commonly 
studied dimensions of OCBs under the headings of "helping behaviors," 
"organizational loyalty," "sportsmanship," "self development," "civic virtue," and 
"individual initiative."49 Helping a coworker with a problem, and acting as a 
peacemaker in the workplace are examples of "helping behaviors," a dimension 
that some researchers call "altruism." An employee who supports the 
organization to those outside the organization portrays "organizational loyalty," 
and an employee who tolerates inconveniences for the good of the organization 
reveals "sportsmanship."49 None of these behaviors is strictly enforceable, but all 
are encouraged and appreciated by supervisors in any work environment, 
including in a health care setting. 
"Civic virtue" and "individual initiative" are particularly important 
dimensions of OCBs for clinicians. "Civic virtue" describes the "willingness to 
participate actively in [an organization's] governance" (p 525)49 by attending 
meetings and expressing one's opinion about the organization's policies. 
Physician participation in decision making is key because physicians are more 
likely to accept a change in a clinic's policies, such as the implementation of a 
clinical guideline, if the clinician was involved in deciding to make the change-'6 
Individual initiative: "involves engaging in task-related behaviors at a level that is 
so far beyond minimally required or generally expected levels that it takes on a 
voluntary flavor" (p 524)_49 Individual initiative, which is some call 
"conscientiousness," encompasses innovative behaviors such as suggesting 
improvements of the organization and volunteering to take on extra responsibility. 
Initiative behaviors in a health care setting include clinician participation in quality 
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improvement projects and volunteering at a free clinic for the good of the 
organization and the community. Clinician "individual initiative" behaviors are 
essential to the functioning of a health care organization. 
Finally, "self-development" describes behaviors such as taking a class to 
learn an organizationally relevant new skill. The "self-development" dimension of 
OCBs has not been examined very often in the literature on OCBs49 but may 
potentially be an important step in ensuring that a high overall quality of care is 
provided in health care settings. 
3. Construct Clarity. LePine, Erez and Johnson suggest that OCB is a 
"latent construct" with all of the dimensions of OCB portraying the same 
underlying "true" OCB construct. In 2002, LePine, Erez and Johnson conducted 
a meta-analysis. The authors compared the relationship of Organ's initial five 
dimensions of OCBs (altruism, conscientiousness, sportsmanship, courtesy, and 
civic virtue); the five dimensions of OCBs were highly related to each other. 
Next, the authors compared the relationship of each dimension to well-studied 
antecedents of OCBs (satisfaction, commitment, fairness, leader support, and 
conscientiousness) and found that for every antecedent the relationship between 
every dimension and the antecedent was comparable.'8 Finally, measuring 
overall OCB versus the individual dimensions of OCB only made a difference in 
the relationship between "commitment" and OCB. The authors concluded that 
the OCB dimensions behave comparably, and thus OCB behaves as a latent 
construct. In a true latent construct the dimensions of OCB should act simply as 
different manifestations of the same overall OCB construct. 57 
Stakeholders' perspectives of OCBs 
1. Researchers on the healthcare work force. The OCB construct is 
relevant to researchers who evaluate the NHSC because OCBs are theoretically 
related to both employee satisfaction and employee retention. As I described in 
the previous section, the relationship between satisfaction and retention of 
clinicians in underserved areas is important in evaluations of the NHSC because 
of the NHSC's goal of increasing clinician retention. 26•28• 31 · 41 · 43· 58 Empirical 
studies provide theoretical links between OCBs and both job satisfaction and 
employee turnover. 
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First, multiple studies examine the relationship between employee 
satisfaction and OCBs.'9 Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine and Bachrach evaluated 
more than 28 studies conducted in multiple different organizational settings, and 
concluded that employee satisfaction is an important antecedent of OCBs.'9 The 
authors did not explain how job satisfaction was measured in the quoted studies. 
In a study of hospital employees, employee satisfaction with coworkers was 
related to OCBs, but other aspects of job satisfaction such as satisfaction with 
work, satisfaction with supervision and satisfaction with pay were not. 54 The 
relationship between satisfaction and OCB is obviously not simple, but the 
literature does theoretically link satisfaction and OCBs. 
Second, OCBs are relevant because they have been linked to actual 
turnover. A study conducted in a Chinese manufacturing industry setting found 
that altruism, conscientiousness and sportsmanship dimensions of OCB were 
related to rates of employee turnover in the next 10 months.50 The authors of the 
study suggested a potential explanation for the relationship between OCBs and 
turnover, surmising that engaging in low levels of OCBs was a way for workers to 
"withdraw" from discretionary work behaviors prior to withdrawing from required 
work behaviors. They argued that "if turnover intention is the attitudinal indication 
of staying or leaving, OCB is the behavioral indication"(p 924).50 Despite the 
theory that OCB is a latent construct, the validity of the relationship between the 
dimensions of civic virtue and individual initiatives and turnover is untested. Also, 
the nature of work in a Chinese factory and a NHSC clinic is dramatically 
different. Despite these limitations and the possible cultural differences between 
the OCB/turnover relationship in China and the U.S., the study gives theoretical 
support to a link between OCBs and turnover, and makes intuitive sense. 
The theoretical basis exists for an examination of the relationship 
between clinician satisfaction, OCBs, and clinician retention. 
2. Site Administrators/Managers. The OCB construct should be 
attractive to NHSC site administrators because it is an easily observable 
measure that may provide a link between job satisfaction and clinician retention. 
Supervisors can easily assess employees' OCBs. In contrast, measuring 
attitudinal variables like clinician satisfaction or turnover intention require 
clinicians to fill out lengthy surveys-"0 Managers of clinics in underserved areas 
are under pressure to recruit and retain quality clinicians in their clinic; retention 
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is particularly important because clinician turnover is expensive. If the 
relationship between physician satisfaction, OCBs and retention proves strong in 
NHSC clinicians, site administrators may be able to observe a clinician's OCBs 
and intervene prior to a clinician leaving the clinic. According to cognitive 
dissonance theory, managers may also be able to decrease employee turnover 
by getting employees involved in OCBs because "once one is engaged in OCB, 
one has to admit to having positive attitudes toward the organization; and once 
one has positive attitudes toward the organization, one will be less willing to 
leave the organization" (p 928).50 
Managers would also benefit from research about potential means of 
encouraging OCBs because managers and organizations benefit from OCBs. 
OCBs represent managers' ideal employee behaviors. Researchers developed 
the original OCB instrument by asking managers "what kinds of things do you like 
to have people in your group do, but you know that you can't actually force them 
to do it, can't prornise any tangible rewards for doing it, and can't punish them for 
not doing it?" (p 93).47 Multiple recent studies also suggest that OCBs increase 
overall organizational effectiveness.'9 Even if OCBs are not related to either 
satisfaction or retention, organizations benefit from OCBs and managers should 
encourage them. 
3. NHSC Administrators. The NHSC should be in favor of an evaluation 
of NHSC clinicians' OCBs. According to a report by Konrad, Leysieffer and 
Stevens et al., NHSC administrators requested the identification of factors 
influencing clinician retention and evidence of clinicians' non-patient care 
contributions.' OCBs are related to turnover in a non-health care setting, and 
therefore OCBs may influence NHSC clinician retention. In addition, measuring 
OCBs would help satisfy HRSA's interest in documenting NHSC clinicians' non-
patient care contributions to their clinical sites and communities.' 
4. NHSC Clinicians. Employees can benefit from and be harmed by 
participation in OCBs. Employees experience personal costs for engaging in 
"individual initiative" OCBs. A recent study of mostly Caucasians in white collar 
jobs found that employees who portrayed "individual initiative" OCBs were more 
likely to have job stress, were more likely to feel that they had insufficient time or 
ability to fulfill all of their responsibilities, and were more likely to have their work-
role interfere with their family-role ("work-family conflict").59 The relationship 
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between individual initiative behavior and work-family conflict is stronger for 
women than it is for men. In contrast, employees who participate in "individual 
initiative" OCBs may be rewarded with higher performance ratings, more rapid 
promotions, and a "greater sense of personal accomplishment" (p 7 45)59 than are 
employees who do not participate in individual initiative OCBs. 
It is unclear how a programmatic focus on OCBs would affect physicians. 
Physicians may benefit from increased recognition of their OCBs, or physicians 
may feel pressured to engage in more OCBs, which could lead to increased 
stress and work-family conflicts, especially for women. Clinicians may be 
particularly at risk for overloading themselves with OCBs because many 
clinicians have Type-A personalities and most are under a time pressure. A 
study of college students found that having a Type-A personality was related to 
engaging in more OCBs and that experiencing a perceived time pressure did not 
affect students' participation in OCBs.6° Clearly, supervisors must be careful to 
complement policies that encourage OCBs with policies to help physicians 
balance individual initiative behaviors with their family obligations. 59 
OCBs as possible measures of retention 
We cannot apply the construct of OCB to NHSC clinicians without 
considering the potential influence of the clinicians' NHSC "obligation." The 
relationship between OCBs and both job satisfaction and retention may be 
influenced by clinicians' service obligation. I could not find literature on the effect 
of an obligation on OCBs, but in a study of hospital employees, continuance 
commitment, or a high perceived cost of leaving a job, was not linked to OCBs. 54 
This suggests that an NHSC obligation, which is designed to demand a high cost 
for not fulfilling a service obligation, will not induce clinicians to participate in 
OCBs. I also believe that we should consider NHSC clinician behaviors aimed at 
improving either the effectiveness of their clinical site or the health of the 
underserved community as OCBs because NHSC clinicians are "employed" by 
underserved communities to improve the health of members of the community. 
The OCB construct is well described in the organizational psychology 
literature but the construct has not been considered in the literature of physician 
behavior. We don't know what makes clinicians who "go the extra mile" different 
from those who don't. Maybe they are more satisfied. Maybe they are more 
committed to serving the underserved. Or maybe clinicians who participate in 
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OCBs are more likely to stay in their underserved community past their 
obligation. Examining the relation of clinician OCBs to both clinician satisfaction 
and clinician retention could potentially further our understanding of clinician 
behavior and elucidate potentially modifiable influences on employee OCBs and 
employee retention. 
Goals of the study. The first goal of this study is to evaluate the 
relationship between unmodifiable clinician factors, modifiable structure and 
process factors and physicians perceived benefits of working for the NHSC (i.e. 
satisfaction) and physician engagement in OCBs. The second goal is to evaluate 
the relationship between physician engagement in OCBs and physician intention 
to stay at their assigned clinical site or intention to continue to serve the 
underserved. Figure 2 (on p. 26) provides a visual representation of the 
hypothetical relationships between physician/site components, OCBs and 
retention. 
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Ill. Study Data and Methods 
Data source and study population. I conducted a secondary analysis of 
large cross-sectional survey data. Data are from mail surveys of nationally 
representative samples of NHSC "current" clinicians, "alumni" clinicians and 
NHSC site administrators in 1998. Data were collected by Thomas R. Konrad, of 
the Sheps Center at UNC-CH, as part of a project entitled "An Evaluation of the 
Effectiveness of the National Health Service Corps."1 This project was 
conducted under contract for HRSA of the US Department of Health and Human 
Services under OMS #0915-0221 during 1998 through a subcontract with 
Mathematica Policy Research (MPR). 
The "alumni" data included clinicians who served NHSC obligations 
between January 1, 1980 and March 13, 1997. I chose not to analyze the 
"alumni" clinician data because such an analysis is beyond the scope of this 
master's paper. The findings from such data would be less politically relevant in 
2006, because a significant portion of NHSC alumni served before the option of 
Loan Repayment existed and before the NHSC revitalization amendments of 
1990. The original study examined physicians, nurse practitioners, physician 
assistants, or nurse midwives. I chose to examine only physicians (MD/DO) to 
narrow the scope of the study and simplify the analysis. 
Physicians. All of the physicians in the study population served part of 
their service obligation on December 31, 1997. The physicians were stratified by 
program type (Scholarship or Loan Repayment) and by type of the current NHSC 
assignment community (urban or rural). The original investigators sent surveys 
to all physicians in a stratum if the stratum represented less than 150 clinicians. 
Surveys were sent to all 92 urban scholars and all 129 rural scholars. 
Investigators used simple random selection with replacement to select 154 out of 
240 possible urban loan repayors and 172 out of 306 possible rural loan repayors 
to include in the sample and survey. Response rates were between 60% and 
72% for the four strata. "Current" clinicians at rural sites were more likely to 
return their surveys than were clinicians at urban sites (78% vs. 70%). Clinicians 
whose sex was "unknown" in the NHSC file were more likely to return their 
surveys than those listed as either male or female, although we do not know the 
25 
significance of this. These response biases are based on data reflecting 
clinicians of all disciplines and are not physician-specific. 
Site administrators. The site administrators worked at sites that 
employed an NHSC clinician at any point between January 1, 1997 and 
February, 1998. Site administrators were identified for every NHSC site from 
NHSC administrative files. The investigators drew a random sample of 369 site 
administrators from a total of 1 ,043 site administrators using "implicit stratification 
for urban/rural location and region"1 After sending the surveys, the investigators 
discovered that identifiers they had used did not identify unique clinical sites, and 
they truly sampled 333 unique site administrators out of a total 869 
administrators. The final adjusted response rate was 62% for site administrators. 
I analyzed data only from the 126 site administrators who reported having at 
least one NHSC MD/DO at their clinical site. 
A. Characteristics B. Modifiable structural 
intrinsic to or and process clements 
unmodifiahle in recruits 
-Age at start of obligation 
-Practice site (rural/urban) 
-Sex [strata] 
-Race 
-Program (SCH vs. LRP) [strata] 
-Grew up in rural or inner city 
-Work Settings 
area (CHC/MHC/IHS) 
-Spouse grew up in rural/inner 
-Length of service obligation 
city 
-Satisfaction with matching 
-Grew up in same state as Site process 
-Medical Specialty 
-# of full time providers 
-Debt from medical school 
- Current salary 
-Economic motivation 
-#of patient encounters/week 
-Marital status 
Figure 2. Ana~ 
plan and model of the D. Organizational Citizenship 
proposed relationship Behaviors 
between clinician/site -Leadership roles -New programs 
factors (A, B, C), -More patients -More services 
OCBs (D) and 
-Quality Improvement/Assurance participation 
Intention to stay/serve 
underserved (E). 
E. "Retention" 
-Intention to stay at same site for I year 
-Intention to stay at same site for 4 years 
C. Kind and 
perceived 
amount of 
benefit 
-Material Benefit 
(satisfaction with 
compensation, C ME, benefits, 
malpractice) 
-Solidary Benefit s (family 
all job satisfaction, over 
satisfaction) 
-Purposive Bene fits 
rve (motivation to se 
underserved) 
Data from 
Administrators 
Survey 
-Intention to serve underserved for 4 vears 
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Survey methods. The surveys were each pretested twice for 
performance of the questions and response burden. Each survey form was eight 
pages long. Targeted clinicians and site administrators were sent the survey up 
to four times between February, 1998 and April, 1998. The investigators also 
"conducted extensive telephone follow-up to ensure that surveys reached 
intended individuals and to encourage responses" (p 15)1. The response rate of 
site administrators was especially low, so the investigators attempted to contact 
every non respondent site administrator by phone. 
Study variables. My overall theoretical model is described in Figure 2 
above. Please see my codebook in Appendix A for more detailed descriptions 
of the variables I used in the analysis. I categorized physicians based on 
unmodifiable variables including physician age at the start of their service 
obligation (S 29, 30-34, 35-39, <: 40); sex; race; whether they grew up in a rural or 
inner city area; whether they grew up in the state of their NHSC clinical site 
assignment; medical specialty; amount of debt from medical school; and degree 
to which economic motivation led the physician to join the NHSC. 
I examined modifiable structural and process components of 
physicians experience including the length of service obligation; work settings 
(CHC/MHC/IHS vs. all others); salary; and the number of patient encounters for 
which the physician is responsible per week; satisfaction with the site matching 
process; and the number of fulltime providers at the clinical site. I also examined 
the practice site (rural/urban) and program type (Scholarship vs. Loan 
Repayment) of clinicians individually and combined into the variable "STRATA" 
(rural Scholarship, rural Loan Repayment, urban Scholarship, urban Loan 
Repayment). 
In the original analysis (by Korad, Leyseiffer and Stevens) some values of 
current salary and educational debt were imputed using ST ATA "hotdecking" 
procedures. The researchers "hotdecked" the current salary based on the 
clinician's discipline and "hotdecked" values of educational debt based on both 
the clinician's discipline and his/her NHSC program (Scholarship or Loan 
Repayment). I created a variable "MISSALARY" where missalary =1 if the salary 
value was imputed and missalary=O if the salary data not imputed. Similarly, I 
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created a variable "MISSDEBT" where missdebt=1 if the debt value was imputed 
and missdebt=O if the debt value was not imputed. I included these variables in 
any multivariate analysis that included current salary or educational debt to test if 
"missing ness" (or imputation) of either salary or debt data effected the outcome 
of the analysis. 
I examined the unique kind and amount of perceived benefit of the NHSC 
clinicians using the Clark and Wilson categories of Material, Solidary and 
Purposive incentives. I used a dichotomous version of a 4-item composite index 
"CASH" that Konrad, Leysieffer and Stevens created measuring clinicians' 
satisfaction with "overall compensation, fringe benefits, continuing medical 
education, and paid malpractice insurance" (p 23) 1 to measure the clinician's 
perceived "material" benefits. The Chronbach's alpha of CASH is 0.79. For more 
information about the creation of the index please see the original report. 1 
I considered questions about physicians' family's experience in the 
community and questions about physicians' overall satisfaction with their work 
experience at the practice site as reflections of physicians' perceived solidary 
benefits (intangible rewards from belonging to the organization). I used a 
dichotomous version of a 12-item composite index "QUAL2" to measure overall 
job satisfaction and a dichotomous version of a 4-item index "SCALFAM2" to 
measure family satisfaction with the community. Konrad, Leyseiffer and Stevens 
created the indices and the dichotomous versions of the indices in their 2000 
report. 1 QUAL2 includes questions about satisfaction with the clerical staff, the 
financial stability of the clinic, the triage system, the condition of the facility, the 
reputation of the site in the local and medical community, the flexibility of 
scheduling at the site, the missions and goals of the site, the number of 
physicians and other health care providers in the clinic and the community, and 
the access to specialists. The Chronbach's alpha is 0.86. SCALFAM2 includes 
questions about spouse satisfaction with living in the community and satisfaction 
with the professional opportunities for the spouse in the community. The index 
also includes questions about clinician's children's satisfaction with the 
community and the family's satisfaction with the educational opportunities 
available for children in the community. The Chronbach's alpha of SCALFAM2 is 
0.90. For more information on either QUAL2 or SCALFAM2, please see the 
original report. 1 
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I considered physicians' stated motivation to serve the underserved as 
evidence of their perceived "purposive" benefit of working for the NHSC. 
Purposive benefits are intangible benefits an employee derives from sharing the 
goal of the organization; serving the underserved is the goal of the NHSC.'6 
I categorized physicians by their level of OCBs. I created an index of 
OCB participation (see Figure 3). The index includes values from dichotomous 
variables describing whether they had held any leadership positions at their 
practice site or at other organizations in the community, created any new 
programs while at their NHSC site, enabled the clinic to see more patients, or 
enabled the clinic to expand the array of services provided. The original survey 
also assessed whether clinicians participated in the "development and/or 
implementation of policies and procedures governing" (pg A-25) 1 six different 
quality improvement activities at their NHSC site including supervising, re-
privileging and credentialing clinical staff, allocating leave time, periodically 
evaluating medical records or working to improve the quality and content of 
medical records, and using a quality assurance committee to resolve patient care 
problems. 1 In the original study, clinicians were scored from 0-6 for involvement 
in quality assurance activities. Among my sample, 94% of physicians 
participated in at least one quality assurance activity. To include participation in 
quality assurance activities in the overall OCB index I had to find a form of the 
variable that more evenly distributed the sample. 
Figure 3: OCB index 
OCB Possible Points 
Answers 
I. Initiated new community program No 0 
Yes 1 
2. Held leadership position during No 0 
NHSC service Yes I 
3. Presence allowed site to reach new No 0 
Patient population Yes I 
4. Presence allowed site to increase No 0 
Array of services provided Yes I 
5. Number of quality assurance activities 0-3 activities 0 
Participated in: 4-6 activities I 
TOTAL POSSIBLE SCORE: 0-5 
Mean OCB score= 2.635 (2.515-2.754) 
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Dividing clinical quality assurance participation into 0-3 activities or 4-6 
activities appeared to distribute the sample most evenly and moved the OCB 
index closer to a normal distribution. Overall, the OCB index ranges from 0-5. 
used casewise deletion to create the index and the Chronbach's alpha of the 
OCB index is .61. 
I used physicians' stated intention to stay at the same site for 1 year and 
4 years post obligation as measures of same site retention and I used physicians' 
intention to serve any underserved population for four years post obligation was 
used to measure CSU. Multiple studies show that intention to leave is a predictor 
of actual turnover. 58• 61 
Data analysis. The MPR developed the final weighting variable "FWGT" 
based on the percentage of clinicians in the sampling frame that were sampled 
and on the response rate. Using STAT A survey commands, I applied the 
weighting, the size of the finite population, and the strata to the entire analysis. 
Univariate. I conducted a descriptive analysis to understand physician 
characteristics, NHSC site characteristics, level of physician's perceived benefits, 
the overall level of OCB participation, and the average level of intended same 
site retention and CSU. I calculated weighted frequencies for categorical 
variables and weighted means for continuous variables. 
Bivariate. I conducted unadjusted analyses to determine which 
independent physician or site factors (A, B, and C in Figure 2) are associated 
with an increased level of OCB participation (0 in Figure 2). I conducted simple 
linear regression to analyze the relationship between continuous independent 
variables (e.g. educational debt} and the OCB index (the continuous dependent 
variable). I calculated predicted mean OCB index scores for various levels of the 
independent variables (e.g. various levels of debt). I performed student's ttests 
to analyze the relationship between dichotomous independent variables (e.g. 
sex) and the OCB index. I calculated predicted mean OCB index scores for each 
category of the independent variables (e.g. male and female). I created dummy 
variables to represent nominal variables with more than two categories (e.g. 
race, physician specialty, and age at start of obligation). Using the dummy 
variables I conducted simple linear regression to examine the relationship 
between the nominal variables and the OCB index. 
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Multivariate. I conducted multiple linear regression to test if the physician 
or site factors are independently associated with the OCB index. I ran a linear 
regression model including 33 variables, but because casewise deletion of 
missing values reduced the sample to 281 observations, I could not rely on using 
a regression model with more than 28 variables (281/1 0= 28). I limited my model 
to 23 variables by dropping age, race, and specialty. All three of the variables 
were very poorly distributed in the descriptive analysis, and all were in the form of 
dummy variables, so dropping them allowed me to remove a total of 10 variables. 
I also removed marital status and location where spouse grew up from the model 
because neither variable was statistically significant and both showed 
multicolinearity with family satisfaction. Finally, I removed number of encounters 
a week from the model because it was not statistically significant. I tested all of 
the dropped variables (age, race, specialty, marital status, location where spouse 
grew up, and clinical encounters) using a partial F test; none was statistically 
significant. The final model includes 20 variables and 302 observations, an 
acceptable ratio (302/20 = 15.1) of cases to variables. In the findings section I 
will only present variables included in the final model. I calculated adjusted mean 
OCB index scores for various levels of the continuous independent variables and 
for each category of the dichotomous independent variables. 
Next, I performed a multivariate analysis to determine whether the OCB 
index (D from Figure 2) is independently associated with intention to stay at the 
same site for 1 or 4 years (SAMESIT1 and SAMES IT 4) and the intention to serve 
underserved for 4 years post obligation (MEDUN4) (3 separate dependent 
variables, E from Figure 2). I developed the models using Analysis of 
Covariance. For each retention variable, I performed linear regression with the 
OCB index as the dependent variable and the retention variable as the 
independent variable. Initially I calculated predicted mean OCB index scores and 
p values for a "fully adjusted" model that included all of the potential interactors in 
the model (33 variables, A, B and C from Figure 2). I tried dropping each 
variable individually from the model looking for variables that decreased the p 
value; this exercise did not vary the magnitude of the predicted mean OCB by 
more than 10%. The final models yield a predicted mean OCB index within 10% 
of the fully adjusted model. 
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I ran logistic regression models for each retention variable with the OCB 
index as the continuous independent variable and the retention variable as the 
dichotomous dependent variable using the interactors from the final models I 
developed using the Analysis of Covariance. I calculated predicted probability of 
intending to stay/serve underserved for various OCB index scores. 
Finally, I performed a matched analysis between the current clinicians 
and a site administrator from their NHSC site. I matched the physicians and 
administrators based on the project identification number, or Bureau of Common 
Reporting Requirements (BCRR) number. I could only match 13% of the 
physicians to site administrators. The goal of the matched analysis was to 
validate physicians' answers to key questions about OCBS as a way to 
"triangulate" or evaluate physicians experiences and sentiments from an 
additional perspective. Unfortunately, the questions that were asked of the 
administrators do not directly parallel the questions asked of the clinicians. Also, 
the site administrators' surveys had many missing values. These limitations in 
the data from the site administrator survey render it neither reliable nor helpful. 
The kappa values for different OCBs varied from -.06 to .235. Overall, a higher 
percentage of site administrators reported physician involvement than did the 
physicians themselves. 
I used a conservative p < .01 cutoff for statistical significance because I 
made multiple comparisons while evaluating multiple steps in my proposed 
model (Figure 2). I will also comment on values of p < .05. All of the statistical 
tests were performed using STAT A version 9.2. 
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IV. Findings 
lntrinsic/Unmodifiable characteristics. The majority of NHSC 
physicians in December, 1997 were white, married male family practitioners who 
were between the ages of 30 and 34 years old at the start of their service 
obligation (Table 1a). Less than half of the physicians and spouses grew up in 
an inner city or a rural area and just over a third (37%) of physicians grew up in 
the state of their NHSC clinical site. The vast majority (85%) of the physicians 
cited financial considerations as an important or very important motivation to join 
the NHSC and the mean educational debt of physicians was close to $100,000. 
Table la: Characteristics of physicians and clinics based on weighted sample 
A. INTRINSIC/UNMODIFIABLE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Sex: 
%male 387 55 
status: 
%married 379 70 
Age at start of obligation: 373 
% <29 yo at start 8.7 
% 30-34 at start 48 
% 35-39 at start 21 
22 
Race: 
%white 70 
%black 15 
% Asian/pacific islander 5.7 
% other/mixed 3.5 
% 6.4 
Specialty: 
%FP 387 51.9 
% Internal medicine 19.8 
% Pediatrician 13.8 
%other 14.6 
Physician background: 372 
with service site in state where 
Source: Data from the MPRJUNC-CH survey ofNational Health Service Corps Current 
NOTE: The results are weighted to account for the response rates and the sampling methodology 
0-
253,018 
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Modifiable structural and process elements. As of 1998, 57% of 
NHSC physicians were serving in rural locations (Table 1b). Most physicians 
were serving two year obligations (68%) in the Loan Repayment program (71%). 
More than a third of the physicians were serving in C/MHC clinical settings and 
very few were serving at either IHS sites (1.8%) or in the Bureau of Prisons 
(.04%). The majority of the physicians were not satisfied with the site matching 
process (80%) and the mean salary of physicians at the time of the survey was 
just over $100,000 a year. 
Kind and amount of perceived benefit. As I expected, the desire to 
serve the underserved was important in most physicians decision to join the 
NHSC (Table 1c), and most physicians were satisfied with the mission and goals 
of their NHSC clinical site. Just under half of the physicians were satisfied with 
their material benefits. Half of the physicians reported that their families were 
satisfied with the community, and 60% of the physicians reported that they were 
satisfied with their jobs overall. 
OCBs. Although OCBs are optional, by definition, 43% of physicians 
reported starting a new community program and 42% of physicians held a 
leadership role during their NHSC obligation (Table 1c). Half of the physicians 
felt that their presence allowed the site to reach a new patient population and 
close the three-quarters of physicians felt their presence allowed the site to 
increase their array of services. Finally, 60% of physicians participated in 4, 5, or 
6 quality assurance activities. As I described in the "Study Data and Methods" 
section, I created an overall OCB index. Table 2 (p 37) demonstrates that the 
physicians' OCB index scores are well distributed and approximate a normal 
curve. 
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Table lb: Characteristics of physicians and clinics based on weighted sample 
B. MODIFIABLE STRUCTURAL AND 
PROCESS ELEMENTS 
Site location: 
%rural 
%urban 
Program: 
Strata: 
% loan repayment program 
% 
% urban scholar 
% urban loan repayor 
%rural scholar 
rural loan 
Site type: 
%C/MHC 
%HIS 
% 
Length of Obligation: 
% with 2 years of obligation 
% with 3 years of obligation 
%with 4 
57 
387 
71 
29 
387 
12 
31 
17 
37 
38 
1.8 
380 
20 
8.1 (.54) 1-208 
Data survey · Corps Current Clinicians 
NOTE: The results are weighted to account for the response rates and the sampling methodology 
Retention. Most physicians intend to stay at their NHSC clinical site for 
one year after completing their NHSC obligation (80%) but less than half (44%) 
intend to stay at their NHSC clinical site for four years after completing their 
NHSC obligation (Table 1c). In contrast, the vast majority of NHSC physicians 
intend to continue to serve underserved populations for four years after 
completing their NHSC obligation (86%). 
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Table lc: Characteristics of physicians and clinics based on weighted sample 
C. KIND AND AMOUNT OF PERCEIVED 
BENEFIT 
PURPOSIVE BENEFITS: 
%initial desire to served underserved was imp or 385 62 
%"satisfied" or "very satisfied" with overall 386 48 
SOLIDARY BENEFITS: 
Job satisfaction: 
%sat or very satisfied with overall job (2:3.5) 
Family Satisfaction: 
%of families sa tor very satisfied with 
D.OCBs 
% initiated a new community program 
%held leadership position during NHSC service 
% presence allowed site to reach a new pt population 
% presence allowed site to increase array of services 
% assurance activities 
E. "RETENTION" 
Intention to Stay at same site: 
% Intend to stay at same site for 1 year post 
obligation 
% Intend to stay at same site for 4 years post 
Intention to Continue to serve underserved: 
% Intend to serve underserved 4 years post 
survey 
386 
382 
367 
379 
385 
385 
384 
324 
60 
51 
43 
42 
49 
72 
59 
80 
44 
86 
NOTE: The results are weighted to account for the response rates and the sampling methodology 
Table 2: Percentage of physicians who report engaging in various numbers of OCBs 
OCB index N %of Chronbach's 
score physicians alpha 
0 360 10.59 .611 
1 14.41 
2 20.4 
3 22.07 
4 20.59 
5 11.95 
Source: Data from the MPR!UNC-CH survey ofNational Health Serv1ce Corps Current Clinicians 
NOTE: The results are weighted to account for the response rates and the sampling methodology 
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Independent associations. Tables 3a, 3b and 3c describe the 
unadjusted and adjusted relationships between physician/site factors and 
physician engagement in OCBs. After adjusting for factors such as physician 
sex, debt, and length of obligation, several factors are statistically significantly 
related to engagement in OCBs. Among the unmodifiable characteristics only 
educational debt was associated with OCB engagement. Physicians with higher 
educational debt tended to engage in more OCBs (Table 3a). Sex, being "local" 
to the site, and growing up in an inner city or rural area were not independently 
associated with OCB engagement. 
Multiple modifiable structural and process elements were independently 
associated with OCB engagement, which is important from a policy perspective 
(Table 3b). For example, physicians with higher salaries engaged in more OCBs 
than physicians with lower salaries and physicians with fewer full time providers 
at their clinical site engaged in more OCBs than physicians with more full time 
providers at their clinical site. Programmatic components such as strata 
(rural/urban and scholarship/loan repayment) and clinical site type both were 
independently associated with OCB engagement. Physicians in the Loan 
Repayment Program serving in rural areas engaged in the most OCBs and 
physicians in the Scholarship program serving in urban areas engaged in the 
fewest OCBs. I also examined the influence of rural/urban location and program 
type (scholarship vs. loan repayment) on OCBs separately. Physicians serving 
in rural areas had higher predicted mean OCB participation than physicians 
serving in urban areas (2.496 vs. 2.065, p= .003, adjusted for same variables as 
Table 3 except strata, also adjusted for program type). Predicted OCB 
participation did not vary by program type (2.313 Loan Repayment, 2.364 
Scholarship, p= .741, adjusted for same variables as Table 3 except strata, also 
adjusted for rural/urban). 
Physicians who worked at federally-funded clinics (C/MHCs or IHS) 
tended to engage in fewer OCBs than physicians who worked at non-federally 
funded clinical sites. In contrast, the length of a physician's NHSC obligation was 
not associated with OCB engagement. As expected, physicians engage in more 
OCBs the longer they had been at their NHSC site. 
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Table 3a: Unadjusted and Adjusted' Comparisons between Physician/Site 
characteristics and predicted mean Organizational Citizenship Behaviors index score 
index from 
A. INTRINSIC/UNMODIFIABLE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Sex: 
Male 
Site in state where physician grew 
up: 
No 
Yes 
Spent pre-college years in inner 
city or rural area: 
No 
Yes 
Educational 
0 
20,000 
50,000 
100,000 
150,000 
Financial motivation to join 
NHSC&: 
Not at all important 
Not important 
Somewhat important 
Important 
197 
227 
120 
200 
149 
360 
360 
2.818 
2.683 
2.548 
2.536 
2.819 
2.126 
2.235 
2.397 
2.668 
2.939 
3.210 
2.007 
2.186 
2.365 
2.545 
2.724 
0.002 
<0.001 
<.001 
171 
199 
103 
172 
130 
302 
302 
Source: Data from the MPRIUNC-CH survey ofNational Health Service Corps Current Clinicians 
NOTE: The results are weighted to account for the response rates and the sampling methodology 
2.749 
2.735 
2.467 
2.603 
2.687 
2.335 
2.404 
2.508 
2.681 
2.854 
3.027 
2.340 
2.427 
2.513 
2.600 
2.687 
#Based on the beta estimates from a multiple linear regression model, adjusted for physician characteristics: 
C/MHC/IHS satisfaction with compensation, satisfaction with job, family satisfaction with community, initial 
desire to serve underserved, current salary, educational debt, time in community, provider grew up/trained in 
state of site, sex, grew up in inner city/rural area, length of obligation, satisfaction with matching process, 
financial motivation for joining NHSC; site characteristics: full-time providers at site, and for imputation of 
current salary and educational debt, and finally strata (program and mral/urban). 
**p < .01 
*.01< p <.05 
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0.517 
0.023 
0.183 
Table 3b: Unadjusted and Adjusted• Comparisons between Physician/Site 
characteristics and predicted mean Organizational Citizenship Behaviors index score 
index from • • I • 
Characteristic n Unadjusted P value n Adjusted 
Predicted Predicted 
Meau Mean 
OCBs OCB 
(0-5) (M) 
B. MODIFIABLE STRUCTURAL 
AND PROCESS ELEMENTS 
Strata <0.001 
Urban scholar 53 1.886 44 2.261 
Urban loan repayor 99 2.425 82 2.415 
Rural scholar 99 2.831 78 2.959 
loan 109 2.972 98 2.742 
Site Type: <0.001 
Other 205 2.830 169 2.804 
C/MHCorlHS 155 2.344 133 2.430 
Length of NHSC 353 0.754 302 
2 years 2.617 2.706 
3 years 2.645 2.570 
4 2.673 2.434 
# of months in the 
2 2.353 
12 2.524 
24 2.729 
Satisfaction with site matching 302 
process&: 
Very unsatisfied 2.673 2.845 
Unsatisfied 2.525 2.735 
Neutral 2.665 2.625 
Satisfied 2.805 2.515 
2.945 2.405 
# offull time providers at 302 
1 2.728 2.739 
21 2.444 2.448 
81 1.594 1.577 
181 0.177 .126 
Current 360 <0.001 302 
50,000 2.256 
70,000 2.397 
100,000 2.609 
2.961 
Source: Data from the survey ofNational Corps Current 
NOTE: The results are weighted to account for the response rates and the sampling methodology 
#Based on the beta estimates from a multiple linear regression model, adjusted for physician characteristics: 
C/MHCIIHS satisfaction with compensation, satisfaction with job, family satisfaction with community, initial 
desire to serve underserved, current salary, educational debt, time in community, provider grew up/trained in 
state of site, sex, grew up in inner city/rural area, length of obligation, satisfaction with matching process, 
financial motivation for joining NHSC; site characteristics: full-time providers at site, and for imputation of 
current salary and educational debt, and finally strata (program and rural/urban). 
**p<.Ol 
*.Ol<p<.05 
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Table 3c: Unadjusted and Adjusted• Comparisons between Physician/Site 
characteristics and predicted mean Organizational Citizenship Behaviors index score 
index from • • • 
Characteristic n Unadjusted p n Adjusted 
Predicted value Predicted 
Mean Mean 
OCBs OCB 
(0-5) (0-5) 
C. KIND AND AMOUNT OF 
PERCEIVED BENEFIT 
PURPOSIVE BENEFITS: 
Initial desire to serve 
underserved&: 358 2.627 0.915 302 2.238 
Not important 2.634 2.385 
Not very important 2.642 2.532 
Somewhat important 2.650 2.679 
Important 2.658 2.826 
v 
MATERIAL BENEFITS: 
Satisfied with compensation: 
** No 112 2.388 0.006 92 2.631 
2.744 
SOLIDARY BENEFITS: 
Satisfied with job: 
No 153 2.627 0.915 124 2.742 
Yes 207 2.640 178 2.568 
Family satisfied with community: 
** No 185 2.478 0.009 155 2.400 
Yes 172 2.800 147 2.893 
survey 
NOTE: The results are weighted to account for the response rates and the sampling methodology 
#Based on the beta estimates from a multiple linear regression model, adjusted for physician characteristics: 
C/MHC/IHS satisfaction with compensation, satisfaction with job, family satisfaction with community, initial 
desire to serve underserved, current salary, educational debt, time in community, provider grew up/trained in 
state of site, sex, grew up in inner city/rural area, length of obligation, satisfaction with matching process, 
financial motivation for joining NHSC; site characteristics: full-time providers at site, and for imputation of 
current salary and educational debt, and finally strata (program and rural/urban). 
**p < .01 
*.OI<p <.05 
OCBs and Retention. Tables 4a and b, 5a and b, and 6a and b describe 
the relationship between OCBs and intention to stay/intention to serve the 
underserved. I present both the Odds Ratios and the predicted probabilities. 
Both are based on the same model and adjusted for the same potential 
interactors, which I list after the predicted probability tables (Tables 4b, Sb, and 
6b). Overall, physicians with a higher OCB score have a higher predicted 
probability of intending to stay at the same site for one year post obligation and 
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have a higher predicted probability of intending to serve the underserved for 4 
years post obligation (Tables 4b + 6b). OCB index score is not independently 
associated with intention to stay at the same site for four years post obligation 
(Tables 5a and 5b). 
Table 4a: Unadjusted and Adjusted' Odds Ratio of OCBs for physicians intending to 
stay or not intending to stay at the same site for one year 
Table 4b: Unadjusted and Adjusted' Predicted Probability of intending to stay one year 
post obligation for physicians with different OCB scores 
OCB score n Predicted Probability 95%CI p 
of intending to stay Value 
Unadjusted: 303 .005 
0 .692 .596-.773 
2 .776 .733-.813 
4 .842 .794- .880 
Final model*: 272 <.001 
0 .654 .521-.767 
2 .800 .747- .845 
4 .895 .844- .930 
Source: Data from the MPRIUNC-CH survey ofNational Health Service Corps Current Chmcmns 
NOTE: The results are weighted to account for the response rates and the sampling methodology 
#adjusted for satisfaction with job, satisfaction with site matching process, number of years of obligation, 
length of time in community, where spouse grew up, and strata. 
**p < .01 
*.Ol<p<.05 
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Table 5a: Unadusted and Adjusted' Odds Ratio of OCBs for physicians intending to stay 
or not intending to stay at the same site for 4 years 
Unadjusted: 303 1.061 .933- 1.206 0.365 
Final model: 295 1.109 .950- 1.294 0.191 
Table 5b: Unadjusted and Adjusted' Predicted Probability of intending to stay four years 
post obligation for physicians with different OCB scores 
OCB score n Predicted Prob. 95 %CI P value 
of intending 
to stay 
Unadjusted: 303 0.365 
0 .400 .313-.495 
2 .429 .380-.479 
4 .458 .396-.522 
Final model*: 295 0.191 
0 .319 .229-.425 
2 .366 .314-.420 
4 .415 .345-.488 
Source: Data from the MPRJUNC-CH survey ofNat10nal Health Servtce Corps Current Chmc1ans 
NOTE: The results are weighted to account for the response rates and the sampling methodology 
# Adjusted for satisfaction with job, initial desire to serve underserved, length in community, sex, and length 
of obligation, and strata. 
**p < .01 
*.Ol<p<.05 
Table 6a: Unadjusted and Adjusted' Odds Ratio of OCBs for physicians intending to 
serve or not intending to serve underserved patients for 4 years post obligation 
Unadjusted: 279 1.213 1.015- 1.450 0.033 
Final model: 236 1.334 1.060- 1.678 0.014 
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Table 6b: Unadjusted and Adjusted" Predicted Probability of intending to serve 
underserved patients four years post obligation for physicians with different OCB scores 
OCB score n Predicted Prob. 95% CI p 
Of intending to value 
stay 
Unadjusted: 2 9 7 0.033 
0 ,788 .697- .857 
2 .845 .807- .877 
4 .889 .843-.923 
Final model*: 236 0.014 
0 .779 .665-.862 
2 .862 .814- .899 
4 .918 .861-.952 
Source: Data from the MPR!UNC-CH survey ofNational Health Service Corps Current Chmctans 
NOTE: The results are weighted to account for the response rates and the sampling methodology 
# Adjusted for job satisfaction, satisfaction with compensation, family satisfaction with the 
community, current salary, educational debt, imputation of salary and debt, number of 
encounters/week, length of time in community, sex, financial motivation to join NHSC, length of 
obligation, satisfaction with matching process, if physician grew up in same state as site, where 
spouse grew up, whether clinic is C/MHC/IHS, and strata. 
**p < .01 
*.Ol<p<.05 
V. Discussion 
The findings from this study suggest that NHSC physician participation in 
OCBs is correlated with intention to stay at the same site one year post obligation 
and intention to serve the underserved four years post obligation. The results 
also suggest that multiple physician and site characteristics are associated with 
engagement in OCBs. Figure 4 summarizes the findings of this study. 
OCBs and intention to stay/serve underserved. I analyzed both 
intended same-site retention and intended CSU because each type of retention 
is important. Same-site retention is important to individual clinical sites that have 
to pay to recruit new physicians, and to NHSC administrators who cannot send 
NHSC physicians to new communities because of the high rate of turnover, and 
finally to patients who are happier and healthier when their primary care provider 
is consistent over time. CSU affects the overall level of medically underserved 
Americans. 
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Figure 4: Revised model of relationship between physician and site characteristics (A, B, 
and C) and OCBs (D) and relationship between OCBs (D) and intention to stay at the 
same site or serve the underserved post obligation (E). Items in bold are statistically 
significantly related to OCBs (D). 
**p < .01 
*.Ol<p <.05 
A. Characteristics intrinsic B. Modifiable structural and C. Kind and amount of 
to or unmodifiable in process elements perceived benefit 
recruits 
-Material Benefits (satisfaction 
-Age at start of obligation -Practice site (rural/urban)** with compensation, CME, 
-Sex -Program (SCH vs LRP) [strata] benefits, malpractice) 
-Race -Work Settings (CHC/MHC/IHS)* 
-Marital status -Length of service obligation -Solidary Benefits 
-Grew up in rural or inner city -Satisfaction with matching process -family satisfaction** 
area -#of full time providers* -overall job satisfaction 
-spouse grew up in rural/lnner city - Current salary** 
-Purposive Benefits (motivation 
-Grew up in same state as site -#of patient encounters/week 
-Medical specialty to serve underserved) 
-Debt from medical school* / -Fr.nnnmic: mntivMinn ~ 
D. Organizational Citizenship Behaviors 
-Leadership roles -New programs 
-More patients -More services 
-Quality Improvement! Assurance participation 
E. "Retention" 
-Intention to stay at same site for 1 year** 
-Intention to stay at same site for 4 years 
-Intention to serve underserved for 4 years* 
According to this study, physicians who participate in higher levels of 
OCBs have a higher predicted probability of intending to stay at their NHSC-
assigned clinic 1 year post obligation. The relationship does not hold for 
intention to stay at the same site for 4 years post obligation, but the strength of 
the association with intention to stay for one year is enough to warrant further 
studies. In addition, physicians who participate in higher levels of OCBs have a 
higher predicted probability of intending to serve the underserved 4 years post 
obligation. This study validates the theoretical link between OCBs and intended 
retention. My results agree with the results of Chen, Hui and Sego's prospective 
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study of the relationship between OCBs and turnover among employees in 
Chinese manufacturing plants.50 My findings also ideologically agree with 
Keller's conclusion that low job performance predicts turnover of employees at a 
communication equipment plant in the southwestern United States61 because 
OCBs are similar to a very high level of job performance. My study shows that 
the theoretical link between OCBs and retention (measured as intention to stay) 
holds for NHSC physicians. 
The relationships between OCBs and intention to stay 1 year and to serve 
underserved patients for four years appear to be clinically (or functionally) 
significant in addition to being statistically significant. For example, a physician 
with an OCB index score of 4 has a .84 predicted probability of intending to stay 
1 year post obligation, but a physician with an OCB index score of 0 has only a 
.69 predicted probability of intending to stay one year post obligation. A .15 
difference is a large magnitude of difference in an approximately normally 
distributed sample, as is true for the OCB index (recall Table 2), 
One limitation of this study is the use of intention to stay and intention to 
serve the underserved to approximate retention rates, rather than measuring 
actual retention. The use of intention to stay as a measure is based on 
traditional turnover models such as the model suggested by Mobley in his 1977 
article. Mobley theorized that withdrawal started with an employee's self-
evaluation of his or her job, leading to job dissatisfaction. After six other 
hypothetical steps, the withdrawal process ends with intention to quit or stay, 
causing an employee to decide to stay or to leave the current job. 58 The Mobley 
article cites evidence that correlates employees' frequency of thoughts of quitting 
with their actual rate of quitting. Mobley also referenced a study by Kraut that 
concluded that salesmen's statements of intention to quit were better predictors 
of actual turnover than were other job attitudes. 58 However, although intention to 
quit is the best correlated antecedent of actual quitting behavior, the correlation is 
not very strong (correlation coefficient= .36).62 
In 1994, Lee and Mitchell proposed an alternative model of voluntary 
employee turnover called the "unfolding model". This model includes 4 possible 
pathways to turnover, as opposed to Mobley's single path theory. All of the paths 
begin with a "shock", which "is a very distinguishable event that jars employees 
toward deliberate judgments about their jobs" (p 60)62. Shocks include "internal" 
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events such as a corporate buy-out of the company or losing a promotion and 
"external" events such as getting married. The type of "shock" and the 
employee's context (including previous experience with the type of shock) 
determine which of the four paths the employee takes towards quitting. Two of 
the pathways do not depend on the withdrawal concept used in traditional 
turnover theories, so would not be adequately captured by measuring "intention 
to leave". For example, an NHSC physician may get great personal satisfaction 
from working at his/her NHSC assigned site and report an intention to stay for at 
least four years past the obligation. However, a shock such as the necessity of a 
new contract at the end of the obligation or a spouse's desire to move closer to 
family may lead the satisfied physician to consider other job opportunities or to 
quit. Many such situations arise: despite a physician's intention to stay, the 
physician ends up leaving. I examined intention to stay rather than actual 
retention because I was limited by the data from the MPRIUNC-CH study of 
NHSC current clinicians. I conducted a secondary analysis of a previous study 
because I had significant time constraints and no funding to conduct original 
research. Ideally, future research should measure physicians' intentions to 
stay/leave and measure physicians' actual retention over time. 
Physician and site characteristics and OCBs. NHSC clinical sites 
benefit from physician participation in OCBs, thus I analyzed the association of 
physician and site characteristics with the OCB index score to generate 
hypotheses for ways to encourage physicians to participate in OCBs. According 
to this study, physicians who work at rural non-C/MHCIIHS clinics participate in 
more OCBs. In addition, physicians who work at clinics with fewer full time 
providers participate in more OCBs. Physicians who have higher educational 
debt, higher current salaries, and whose families are satisfied with the community 
participate in more OCBs. 
I was not surprised to find that a significant portion of the NHSC 
physicians in December of 1997 were serving at C/MHC sites because HRSA 
oversees both the NHSC and the CHC/MHC programs. According to this study, 
physicians who work in C/MHCs or at IHS sites participate in fewer OCBs than 
do other physicians. The relationship still held when I separated out the C/MHC 
physicians. Physicians at C/MHCs participated in fewer OCBs than did those in 
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non-governmentally funded clinics (non-C/MHC/IHS/bureau of prisons, 2.449 vs. 
1.829 predicted OCB index score, p<.001 ). Perhaps the C/MHCs are better 
established clinics with less need for new programs and expansion of services. 
Or maybe physicians do not feel as needed or inspired at governmentally funded 
clinics that have been staffed by NHSC physicians for years. 
Physicians in rural areas and at sites with fewer full time providers 
participated in more OCBs as hypothesized. Perhaps rural sites and smaller 
clinics are in more obvious need of new community programs and expansion of 
services. Rural sites may be further from large hospitals that provide community 
outreach programs, and it may be more ethically challenging to do only the bare 
minimum at a small clinic, where there are no other providers to pick up the 
slack, and where the need is so great. 
I am not sure why physicians with higher educational debt participate in 
more OCBs than physicians with lower educational debt. Physicians who 
accepted fewer years of NHSC support during medical school would incur a 
greater amount of educational debt. However, the relationship between 
physicians' educational debt load and physicians' level of participation in OCBs 
remained significant when I included the length of physicians' NHSC obligation in 
the model. Higher educational debt may possibly be a proxy for having come 
from a relatively disadvantaged background and, hence, feeling an even stronger 
identification with vulnerable populations, and a stronger desire to serve. 
This study suggests that physicians with higher current salaries 
participate in more OCBs. I do not know if raising physicians' salaries would 
result in increased participation in OCBs, but this is a testable hypothesis. 
Physicians who participate in more OCBs may have higher salaries as a result of 
being rewarded for their extra efforts. OCBs are optional by definition, but site 
administrators may reward physicians who go "above and beyond" with larger 
raises. Future studies should examine physician's starting salaries and the rate 
of salary increase over time for physicians with different levels of participation in 
OCBs to determine if increased salary causes or results from higher OCB 
participation. Imputation of salary and debt information did not affect the 
outcome of the analysis because neither the variable for missing debt information 
nor the variable for missing salary information were significant in the final models. 
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Despite the strong relationship between current salary and OCBs, 
perceived material benefits were not related to OCBs. The relationship between 
satisfaction with compensation (perceived material benefits) and OCBs was not 
even close to significant. To ensure that current salary was not interacting with 
satisfaction with compensation I removed current salary from the model and 
reran the analysis. The relationship between satisfaction with compensation and 
OCBs remained non-significant (p= .48). The measure of satisfaction with 
compensation includes questions about satisfaction with continuing medical 
education (CME) paid by the clinic, fringe benefits, and malpractice insurance in 
addition to satisfaction with total compensation. Perhaps the relationship 
between satisfaction with salary and OCBs is strong, but the inclusion of 
satisfaction with benefits, CME, and malpractice diluted the relationship. 
Physicians whose families are satisfied with the community participate in 
higher levels of OCBs. A physician with an unsatisfied family may feel the need 
to spend more time with them. Families who are satisfied with the community 
may have formed stronger social relationships in the community and be less 
dependent on the physician for emotional support. Family satisfaction with the 
community is also an important predictor of same site retention.1· 34 However, in 
1994, the NHSC did not reimburse providers for spouses to attend site visits and 
28% of NHSC providers vs. 17% of non-NHSC spouses complained that their 
spouses "did not know what to expect of the community before arriving" (p 
1343).34 Taking these two sets of findings together, the inability of a spouse to 
accompany the physician on a site visit may have influenced the spouse's 
happiness with the community, which may in turn affect the physician's ability to 
participate in OCBs and decrease the chance that the physician would stay in the 
assigned community post-obligation. As of March 41h, 2006 a NHSC provider will 
only "be reimbursed for one family member to visit one site one time" (NHSC web 
site).63 Although this is better than no allowance for spouses to attend site visits, 
there is room for improvement. 
Some physician and site factors appear to be unrelated to OCBs and are 
worth discussing briefly. First, sex was not related to participation in OCBs. 
Despite prior evidence that the relationship between individual initiative-type 
OCBs and work-family conflict is stronger in women59 I did not find a difference in 
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the level of participation in OCBs between men and women in this study when I 
controlled for other physician and site characteristics. 
Second, physicians who grew up in the same state as their NHSC site 
participated in non-significantly fewer OCBs than physicians who grew up in a 
state other than the location of the site. Although the relationship is not 
significant, the trend suggests that physicians from the local area do less "extra" 
tasks than transplants. "Local" physicians may have more social ties in the area 
that distract them from participating in "extra" work for the clinic. 
Third, the NHSC takes into account the type of community in which 
applicants grew up because physicians from rural or inner city backgrounds, as 
opposed those from the suburbs or small cities, are more likely to stay at a site 
like the place they grew up -- physicians from rural backgrounds more often stay 
in rural sites, and physicians who grew up in the inner city are more likely to stay 
at an inner city site, post obligation.1 However, physicians from rural or inner city 
backgrounds do not participate in more or fewer OCBs. 
Fourth, the NHSC considers the race of NHSC applicants, not only 
because one of the goals of the NHSC is to increase the presence of minorities 
in health care, but also because some past studies suggested that ethnic 
minorities are more likely to continue to serve underserved populations than non-
minorites.26 According to my analysis, white physicians participated in more 
OCBs than did physicians of other races (2.69 OCBs for whites vs. 2.56 OCBs 
for African Americans) but the relationship did not hold when I adjusted for other 
physician and site characteristics. I removed race from the final model because 
physician race was poorly distributed (252 whites, 52 blacks, 21 Asians, 21 
Hispanics). I cannot comment on whether the NHSC should continue to consider 
race as important in recruiting. 
Fifth, I found no clear relationship between overall job satisfaction and 
participation in OCBs. It is possible that there truly is no relationship between the 
two, but it is also possible that the measure of overall job satisfaction in this study 
is not adequate, because physician satisfaction is difficult to measure. For 
example, in 1999 Williams, Konrad and Linzer et al. reported developing a 
physician job satisfaction measure in the Physician Worklife Survey (PWS). The 
measure examines 10 factors of job satisfaction through a 38 question survey. 64 
The authors of the study tested the validity of the job satisfaction measurement 
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by testing the convergent and discriminant validity. The MPR/UNC-CH survey of 
NHSC current physicians on which analysis is based did not use the PWS 
physician satisfaction measure or a similarly in-depth and validated measure. 
The measure of job satisfaction used in this study was based on a series of 12 
questions. The measure had a high Chronbach's alpha (.79) but may not directly 
parallel other physician satisfaction measures such as the PWS. Evidence from 
other fields suggests that employee satisfaction is an important precursor of 
participation in OCBs49 but job satisfaction is not measured consistently across 
studies. Thus, I can only conclude that job satisfaction, as measured in the 
current study, is not related to OCB participation. Ideally, all future studies 
examining the link between job satisfaction and OCBs would use a single well-
validated measurement tool to allow simple comparisons of results across 
multiple studies. 
With this study I hope to introduce the concept of OCBs into research of 
NHSC physicians. The idea of OCBs is common in the organization psychology 
literature. I analyzed survey data from 1997/1998 because it was not 
economically feasible for me to conduct a new prospective study as a master's 
student. Ideally, I would conduct a prospective national survey of NHSC 
physicians and an equivalent control group of non-NHSC physicians. I would 
use well validated measures of job satisfaction, family satisfaction and 
satisfaction with compensation. I would design and pre-test explicit questions 
about multiple types of OCBs based on previous research on OCBs and I would 
assess both intention to stay/serve underserved and actual retention rates over 
time. I would also conduct a simultaneous survey of site administrators with 
parallel questions to confirm the validity of the physicians' answers. 
Despite the inevitable limitations of a cross-sectional secondary analysis 
from one point in time, the information gleaned from the 1997/1998 survey is still 
relevant today. The MPR/UNC-CH survey is the most recent national survey of 
NHSC physicians and it assesses the "new" post-1990 revitalization state of the 
NHSC. The present analysis has confirmed that participation in OCBs is 
theoretically linked to intention to stay and intention to serve the underserved 
among NHSC physicians, which suggests that participation in OCBs may be 
associated with actual retention rates among NHSC physicians. This study also 
reveals multiple physician and site characteristics that are correlated with 
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increased participation in OCBs. Future studies can individually and rigorously 
explore the link between OCB participation and current salary, rural practice 
location and family satisfaction. 
This study suggests that the NHSC should direct more resources toward 
ensuring that families are satisfied with the community because physicians with 
satisfied families participate in more OCBs. One potential means of improving 
family satisfaction with the community would be to reimburse NHSC recipients for 
a family member to visit multiple sites and to revisit a site to ensure that they will 
be satisfied with the community. 
We also need to learn more about how site administrators can easily 
identify low-OCB participating physicians. Perhaps counting the number of 
OCBs in which a physician participates is sufficient, or possibly participation in 
certain types of OCBs is more indicative of increased retention. We also need to 
investigate how to intervene when a physician is a low OCB participator. We 
should explore whether increasing a physician's salary increases his/her level of 
participation in OCBs, and test if an increase in OCBs translates into increased 
retention. Finally, we should investigate whether encouraging participation in 
OCBs increases same-site retention or CSU. 
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VI. Conclusions 
The NHSC is based on an indenture model of physician behavior. 
Indenture models "require a fixed period of service in an area designated by 
society as needy" (p 31 ).25 Other models of ways to recruit and retain physicians 
in rural underserved areas include "affinity models," recruiting would-be providers 
from backgrounds similar to those of the underserved, "economic incentive 
models" that propose to induce physicians to settle in underserved areas with 
salaries equivalent to what they can earn in more affluent communities; "practice 
characteristic models" that attempt to reduce the isolation of rural areas through 
technological bridges between the rural location and large hospital settings25 
According to Crandall, Dwyer and Duncan, programs based on the 
indenture model such as the NHSC can either be used as temporary fixes while 
a needy area attempts to find a permanent solution or as a "permanent systern 
that tacitly acknowledges that [affinity rnodels, economic incentive models, and 
practice characteristic models] will not succeed in providing physicians for all 
medically underserved areas" (p 31 ).25 
The number of medically underserved communities in the United States is 
large. The NHSC will never single-handedly solve the problem of medically 
underserved areas in the United States. We need to employ a variety of 
techniques, including programs based on the affinity model, the economic 
incentive rnodel, and practice characteristic model, in addition to getting the most 
from the NHSC. It is to be hoped that, by tweaking the programmatic 
characteristics of the NHSC, we can increase the same-site retention of NHSC 
physicians, thus creating a permanent solution for some underserved 
communities. Also, by increasing the CSU, we may be able to decrease the 
overall burden of medically underserved communities. 
OCBs are a promising area of research for the NHSC. OCBs are a 
positive end in themselves, and this study shows that participation in OCBs is 
correlated with both intention to stay at the same site for one year post obligation 
and intention to serve the underserved four years post obligation. Research into 
NHSC physician participation in OCBs may be one key to helping the NHSC 
provide a permanent solution for some medically underserved communities by 
encouraging same-site retention and CSU. 
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VIII. Appendix 1: Codebook 
A. Ph 1ysicians 
1 id Respondent id 
2 cohbcrr BCRR number for cohort assignment (for 
matching with site administrator data set). 
3 nsource Dichotomous From source file- Program in which 
respondent participated 
1 = loan repayment program 
2= SCH program 
.= missing (none missing) 
4. nrural Dichotomous From source file- urban or rural site 
location, numeric 
1= rural site 
2= urban site 
.= missing (none missing) 
5. typesite >2 categories From source file- type of site: coded from 
BCRR numbers 
1= C/MHC 
2= IHS 
3= bureau of prisons 
4= other type of site 
.=missing 
6. cmhc_ihs Dichotomous Site is C/MHC or IHS 
0= no 
1= yes 
(0/387 missing) 
7. ndispcat >2 categories From source file- discipline category 
1:DDS 
2:MD/DO 
3:NON-MD dentist 
.=missing 
[used to make only MDs] 
8. doctors 2 categories Subpopulation variable for analysis only 
of doctors 
O:non-doctors 
1 :doctors 
[created to use as sub pop in svy analysis 
to allow weighting.] 
[created 5111106 by AKC in do file] 
9. nmdspec >2 categories From source file- MD specialty 
category 
1:FP 
2:1NT 
3:0TH 
4:PED 
.=missing 
10 clocal dichotomous From Source file and Q43c- service 
site was in state where respondent 
grew up 
0= NOT local origin 
1 = local origin 
.=missing 
58 
11 csex dichotomous 
12 cstatus >2 categories 
13 married dichotomous 
14 clvd4 >2 categories 
15 home dichotomous 
16 clvd5 >2 categories 
17 spousehome dichotomous 
18 genmare > 2 categories 
Q37- respondents sex 
0= male 
1= female 
.=missing 
038- marital status 
1= married 
2= separated 
3= divorced 
4= widowed 
5= never married 
.= missinq 
0= separated, divorced, or never 
married 
1= married 
.=missing 
[created 5/9/06 by AKC in do file] 
044- type of place where respondent 
spent most of his/her pre-college years 
1 = inner city 
2= urban 
3= suburban 
4= rural 
.=missing 
type of place where respondent spent 
most of his/her pre-college years 
0= other (urban/suburban) 
1= inner city or rural 
.=missing (12 missing) 
[created 5/9/06 by AKC in do file] 
045- Type of place where respondent"s 
spouse spent most of his/her precollege 
years 
1 = inner city 
2= urban 
3= suburban 
4= rural 
5= Not applicable 
.= missinq 
If married, spouse spent pre-college 
years in inner city or rural area: 2 
categories: 
O:other (urban/suburban) or not 
applicable 
1 :inner city or rural 
.=missing 
(52 missing 
[created 519106 by AKC in do file] 
altered 5/23/06 
037 + 38- sex/marital status 
1 = male married 
2= male NOT married 
3= female married 
4= female NOT married 
.= missinq 
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19 cnagest >2 categories 
20 cages! Continuous 
21 newrace2 >2 categories 
22 ccomp5a Continuous 
23 hotcsal Continuous 
24 missalary Dichotomous 
25 ccomp1 Continuous 
26 newdebt Continuous 
27 hotdebt continuous 
28 missdebt dichotomous 
29 cencoun continuous 
Q36+ Q9- age at first NHSC assignment 
(categorical) 
1 = less than or equal to 29 
2= 30-34 
3= 35-39 
4= greater than or equal to 40 
.=missing 
Q36 + Q9- Age at first NHSC 
assignment (continuous) 
20-60 
.=missing 
1:White 
2:Biack 
3:Asian1Pacific Islander 
4:0ther1Mixed 
5:Hispanic 
.=missing 
Q32e- Current salary 
25,000-220,000 
.= missing (48 missing) 
Current salary with hotdecking 
imputation 
25,000-220,000 
(0 missing) 
Variables missing current salary info 
O:have current salary 
1 :imputed missing current salary 
[Will use to test if imputation effects 
results of multivariate analysis] 
[created 5/11106 bv AKC in do file] 
Q32a-Respondents total outstanding 
educational debt at completion of clinical 
training. 
0-250,000 
-9= unspecified dollar amount 
.=missing 
Educational debt in 1996 dollars 
-numeric (continuous) 
0- 253,017 
(13 missing) 
Educational debt in 1996 dollars, 
hotdecked 
-numeric (continuous) 
0-253,017 
(0 missing) 
Variables missing educ debt info 
O:have educ debt 
1 :imputed missing educ debt 
[Will use to test if imputation effects 
results of multivariate analysis} 
[created 5111106 by AKC in do file] 
Q15- Number of patient encounters per 
week 
1-400 
.=missing 
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30 moncomm continuous Number of months in the community L 
(time to participate in OCBs) 
-Continuous, 1-74 months 
31 payoff > 2 categories Motivation: financial assistance (1-5) 
1= not important 
3= somewhat important 
5= very important 
32 obllen >2 categories Years of obligation 
2,3,or4 
(7 missing) 
33 satmtchp >2 categories -Q7a + 7d: Assess satisfaction with 
process of matching to an NHSC site 
(#of sites available and preparation for 
negotiating with site) 
1= strongly disagree 
3= neutral 
5= strongly agree 
34 ftprov continuous #of full time providers at the site 
Range= 1-208 
.=missing (17) 
[idea= more physicians means fewer OCB 
opportunities per physician] 
35 digoal dichotomous Q7b: Site met goals 
0= no 
1= yes 
.= missinq (4) 
36 crund >2 categories Reason considered NHSC service: 
wanted to provide care in an underserved 
area 
1= not imp 
2= not very imp 
3= somewhat imp 
4= important 
5= very important 
.N= not applicable 
.= missinq 
BENEFITS 
Purposive 
37 scalund >2 categories Initial desire to serve the underserved 
1= not imp 
2= not very imp 
3= somewhat imp 
4= important 
5= very important 
.= missing (2) 
38 cspgoal >2 categories Q24n- satisfaction with mission and goals 
of site 
1 =very dissatisfied 
3= neutral 
5= verv satisfied 
Material 
39 dcash dichotomous Satisfaction with compensation 
O:Not lmportlsatis 
1: lmoortlsatis 
61 
40 Cash > 2 categories 
Solidary 
41 qual continuous 
42 dqual dichotomous 
FAMILY SATIS. 
43 scalfam2 continuous 
44 dscalfam2 dichotomous 
OCBS 
45 newprog Dichotomous 
46 Newprog3 dichotomous 
47 leader1 dichotomous 
48 Leader dichotomous 
49 Numqa3 >2 categories 
Satisfaction with compensation 
1-5 (5= positive) every .25 
Job satisfaction 
1-5 (5 positive) 
Job satisfaction 
O:Not lmport/satis 
1 :lmport/satis 
Family satis scale (NA=3,5=pos) 
1-5 (5 positive) 
Family satis scale (NA-3,5-pos 
O:Not lmport/satis 
1 :lmport/satis 
021- Initiated a new community program 
O=No 
1=Yes 
.=missing 
021- Initiated a new community program 
O=No 
1=Yes 
[5115 made .=OJ 
022- Held leadership position during 
N H SC service 
O=No 
1=Yes 
[5115 made .=OJ 
022- Held leadership position during 
NHSC service 
O=No 
1=Yes 
.=missing 
023- Sum of the number of OA areas that 
respondent participated in: 
Participation in development and/or 
implementation of policies and 
procedures for: 
1 )supervision + backup of clinical staff, 
2)clin performance evals/repriv of clinical 
staff, 
3) qual and content of medical records, 
4) periodic evaluation of medical records 
5) resolution of patient care problems by 
OA committee, 
6) credentialing of licensed/certified 
clinical staff, 
Score from 0-6 
[excluded other be 354/387 missing and 
leavetime/funding be not really OA) 
[5/15 made .=OJ 
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50 Numqa2 >2 cat 023- Sum of the number of QA areas that 
respondent participated in: 
Participation in development and/or 
implementation of policies and 
procedures for: 
1 )supervision + backup of clinical staff, 
2)clin performance evals/repriv of clinical 
staff, 
3) qual and content of medical records, 
4) periodic evaluation of medical records 
5) resolution of patient care problems by 
OA committee, 
6) credentialing of licensed/certified 
clinical staff, 
Score from 0-6 
[excluded other be 354/387 missing and 
leavetime/funding be not really OA] 
.=missing 
[Used to create OCB5J 
51 qacat >2 categories RECODE of numqa2 (# OA areas 
participate in (revised)) 
O:none 
1:1-2 activities 
2: 2-4 activities 
3:5-6 activities 
.=missing 
[Used to create OCB4J 
52 Qacat2 dichotomous RECODE of numqa2 
0= 0-3 activities 
1 = 4-6 activites 
.=missing 
[used to create OCB2J 
53 Oacat3 >2 categories RECODE of numqa2 
0= 0 activities 
1 = 1-3 activities 
2= 4-6 activities 
.=missing 
[used to create0CB3J 
54 anyqa3 dichotomous 023- respondent participated in any OA 
area 
0= no 
1= yes 
[5/15 made .=OJ 
55 Anyqa2 dichotomous 023- respondent participated in any OA 
area 
0= no 
1= yes 
.=missing 
[used to create OCBJ 
56 cnewpt3 dichotomous 019a- due to respondents presence, site 
has reached new patient populations 
0= no 
1= yes 
[ 5115 made . =OJ 
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57 Cnewpt2 dichotomous Q19a- due to respondents presence, site 
has reached new patient populations 
0= no 
1= yes 
.=missing 
58 cincsv3 dichotomous 019b- due to respondents presence, site 
has increased array of services 
0= no 
1= yes 
[5115 made .=OJ 
59 Cincsv2 dichotomous Q19b- due to respondents presence, site 
has increased array of services 
0= no 
1= yes 
.=missing 
60 ocb > 2categories -newprog + leader + anyqa2 + cnewpt2 + 
cincsv2 (0-5) 
0= no ocbs 
1= 1 ocb 
2= 2 ocbs 
3= medium ocbs 
4 
5= high ocbs 
. = missinq 
61 ocb2 >2categories ocb2- newprog + leader+ qacat2 + 
cnewpt2 + cincsv2 (0-5) 
0= no ocbs 
1= 1 ocb 
2= 2 ocbs 
3= medium ocbs 
4 
5= high ocbs 
. =missing 
[chose qacat2 because is best distributed, 
most normal curve] t 
62 Ocb3 >2categories ocb3- newprog + leader + qacat3 + 
cnewpt2 + cincsv2 (0-6) 
0= no ocbs 
1= 1 ocb 
2= 2 ocbs 
3= 3 ocbs ' L 
4= medium ocbs 
5= high ocbs 
6= very high ocbs 
. =missing 
63 ocb4 >2 categories Index of# of ocbs, receded 0-7 (adds 
cincsv3 + leader2 + cnewpt3 + qacat + 
newprog3] 
O:no ocbs 
1:1ow ocbs 
4:medium ocbs 
7: high ocbs 
[no missing because adds up scores of 5 
items, and not missing all 5 in any. 
Assume.= OJ 
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64 Ocb5 generate ocb5- newprog + leader + 
numqa2 + cnewpt2 + cincsv2 (0-9) 
RETENTION L 
65 Samesit1 dichotomous Same site reten GE 1 yr 
(blank,DK=miss) 
(predict will stay at site for 1+ years 
after obligation) 
O:No 
1:Yes 
66 Samesit2 dichotomous Same site reten GE 2 yr 
(blank,DK=miss) 
(predict will stay at site for 1 + years 
after obligation) 
O:No 
1:Yes 
67 Samesit4 dichotomous Same site reten GE 4 yr 
(blank,DK=miss) 
(predict will stay at site for 1 + years 
after obligation) 
O:No 
1:Yes 
68 Medun4 dichotomous Underserved reten GE 4 yrs 
(blank,DK=miss) 
(predict will work with underserved 
populations for 4+ years after 
obligation) 
O:No 
1:Yes 
WEIGHTING 
69 strata >2 categories 1- urban scholar (55) 
2= urban loan repayor (1 04) 
3= rural scholar (105) 
4= rural loan repayor (123) 
70 sampn >2 categories -Size of the Sample of the strata 
•92 in the Sample of strata 1 
•154 in the Sample of strata 2 
•129 in the Sample of strata 3 
•172 in the Sample of strata 4 
71 totcnt >2 categories -Total in sampling frame for strata 
•92 is the total size of strata 1 
• 240 is the total size of strata 2 
•129 is the total size of strata 3 
; 
L 
•306 is the total size of strata 4 
72 bwgt >2 categories base weight - (total in sampling frame of 
(?Or strata/ sample size) 
continuous?) -weight= 1 for strata 1 
-weight= 1.5558 for strata 2 
-weight= 1 for strata 3 
-weight= 1. 779 for strata 4 
73 Fwgt Final weight to use in calculations 
65 
B SITE ADMINISTRATORS 
74. id Respondent id 
75. sstfd continuous 07. Total yrs. had atleast1 NHSC clinician 
[.25.281 ran~e 
76. sndoc continuous 9.1.c. Total Current NHSC physicians 
-from 0-18 
77. mds Dichotomous Subpopulation variable for analysis only of 
administrators with NHSC doctors 
O:no doctors 
1: have doctors 
[created to use as subpop in svy analysis to 
allow weighting.] 
[created 5129106 by AKC in do file] 
78. docs constant Egen value, constant of 231 for all 
observations (number of MD/Dos 
represented by surveys) 
79. ssites continuous Number of clinic sites organization has 
1-62 
.= missinq (28/212 missinq) 
80. sqapln dichotomous Q 18a- site has a written quality assurance 
plan 
0= No 
1= Yes 
.=missing (21/212) 
81. sqasup dichotomous Q18b1- site's written QA plan includes 
policies and procedures on supervision 
0= No 
1= Yes 
82. sqalv dichotomous Q18b2- site's written QA plan on funding of 
leave time for clinical staff 
0= No 
1= Yes 
83. sqarec dichotomous Q18b3- site's written QA plan on quality 
and content of medical records 
0= No 
1= Yes 
84. sqarev dichotomous Q18b4- site's written QA plan on review of 
medical records 
0= No 
1= Yes 
85. sqaeval dichotomous Q18b5- site's written QA plan on 
repriveledging of clinical staff 
0= No 
1= Yes 
86. sqapt dichotomous Q18b6- site's written QA plan on actions of 
QA committee in resolving pi care problems 
0= No 
1= Yes 
87. sqacred dichotomous Q18b7- site's written QA plan on 
credentialing licensed/certified clinical staff 
0= No 
1= Yes 
66 
88. sqaoth dichotomous 018b8- site's written OA plan on another }-
aspect of clinical care 
0= No 
1= Yes 
89. nptadmin dichotomous Added up all populations (12) (presence of 
NHSC clinician allowed this site to reach 
new pt population) 
0= no new population 
1 = new population 
90. phylead continuous # NHSC physicians who hold leadership 
positions 
0-4 
.=missing 
91. aldphy dichotomous NHSC physicians in leadership positions 
O=no 
1= yes 
.= missinq 
92. phynsa continuous # NHSC physicians who added new 
services 
0-4 
.=missing 
93. ansphya dichotomous N HSC physicians- added new services 
O=no 
1= yes 
.=missing 
94. phynse continuous # N HSC physicians who expanded services 
0-4 
.= missinQ 
95. ansphye dichotomous NHSC physicians- expanded services 
O=no 
1= yes 
.=missing 
96. exarray dichotomous NHSC physicians add or expand services 
Add together ansphya + ansphye (with .= 0 
for both). 
1 = 1 for ansphya +/or ansphye 
0= neither 
97. phyqi continuous # NHSC physicians who developed quality 
improvement programs 
0-4 
.= missinQ 
98. aqiphy dichotomous NHSC physician developed 01 program 
0= No 
1= yes 
.=missing 
99. phyqiim continuous # NHSC physicians whose 01 program 
improved standards of care 
0-4 
.=missing 
100 phynp continuous # N HSC physicians who started a new 
community program 
0-4 
.= missinq 
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101 Anpphy Dichotomous N HSC physicians added new Program 
0= No 
1= yes 
.=missing 
102 fnlwgt Final adjusted weight 
103 strata Strata ( onlv1- used for weiahtina purooses) 
104 totcnt Population count (used for weighting 
purposes) 
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